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INTRODUCTION
Wrongful conviction has for decades been a subject of academic
study, litigation, and policy reform, but its more recent reach into
popular culture is reflected in an array of books,1 documentaries,2
podcasts,3 movies,4 and TV shows.5 In both non-fiction and fiction,
the theme of wrongful conviction marries a traditionally American
revulsion of profound injustice with the captivation of the police
procedural, dirty cops, forensic evidence, and the relentless fortitude
of incarcerated innocents and their heroic lawyers.
The innocence movement lies at this intersection between law
and popular imagination. As the attendance at the 2018 Innocence
Network Conference6 attests, the energy of the innocence movement
over the last twenty-five years has not flagged. It continues to secure
exonerations and to publicize them, to advocate for the appropriate
use of scientifically sound forensic science, to press for improved
police and investigative procedures, and to support the creation of
conviction integrity units to revisit potential wrongful convictions.7
1

2

3

4
5
6
7

See, e.g., Sarah Burns, The Central Park Five (2012); Gillian Flynn,
Dark Places (2009); John Grisham, The Innocent Man (2006);
Tayari Jones, An American Marriage (2018); Bryan Stevenson,
Just Mercy (2014); Jennifer Thompson-Cannino and Ronald
Cotton, Picking Cotton: Our Memoir of Justice and Redemption
(2009).
See, e.g., The Central Park Five (WETA & Florentine Films 2012); West
of Memphis (WingNut Films & Disarming Films 2012); Southwest of
Salem: The Story of the San Antonio Four (Sam Tabet Pictures 2016);
Time Simply Passes (Tanman Films 2016). See also Innocence Project,
Must-See Wrongful Conviction Films and TV Shows, Innocence Project (Oct.
28, 2016), www.innocenceproject.org/wrongful-conviction-media/.
See, e.g., In the Dark: Season 2: Curtis Flowers, APM Reports (2018), https://
www.apmreports.org/in-the-dark/season-two; Accused: The Unsolved Murder
of Elizabeth Andes, Cincinnati Enquirer (Sep. 7, 2016), https://www.
cincinnati.com/series/accused; Empire on Blood, Panoply (Feb. 28, 2018),
(available on iTunes); Wrongful Conviction with Jason Flom, Revolver Podcasts
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://wrongfulconvictionpodcast.com; Serial, Nat’l Pub.
Radio (Oct. 3, 2014), https://serialpodcast.org; Actual Innocence, Borrowed
Equip. Podcasts (Apr. 24, 2016), https://www.borrowedequipmentpods.
com/actual-innocence/; Misconduct: A True Crime Podcast, Stitcher (Jan. 2,
2017), https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/misconduct-a-true-crime-podcast.
Conviction (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2010); Thin Blue Line (Miramax
Films 1988); The Hurricane (Beacon Pictures 1999).
Rectify (SundanceTV Apr. 22, 2013); Making a Murderer (Netflix Dec. 18, 2015).
A version of this article was presented as part of the 2018 Innocence Network
Conference in Memphis, Tennessee on March 23–24, 2018.
See Robert J. Norris, Exonerated: A History of the Innocence
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During an evening of the 2018 Conference, dozens of
exonerees were introduced and welcomed, while a slideshow of
photographs of the wrongly convicted was displayed. That moving
tribute compels me to start this article with an apology. My empirical
study of wrongful conviction compensation, described in Section I
of this Article, turns people into categories, tags, codes, numbers,
and statistical units, a necessary but dehumanizing contrast to
the Conference’s celebration of real people, and their suffering,
humanity, and freedom.
The stories told at the Conference of the exonerated do not end
in a DNA laboratory or when the prison cell opens. Understandably,
compensation for wrongful conviction has attracted less public
attention than the efforts to free the innocent and to prevent
wrongful convictions. But it is hardly invisible. The press frequently
reports on lawsuits seeking relief, verdicts and settlements in
wrongful conviction compensation cases,8 and unsuccessful efforts
to compensate victims of wrongful convictions.9
8

9

Movement (2017).
See. e.g., Pam Kragen, Carlsbad Man Exonerated After Nearly 39 Years in Prison
Receives $21 Million Settlement, San Diego Union-Trib. (Feb. 25, 2019, 6:05
PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/communities/north-county/
sd-no-coley-settlement-20190225-story.html; Eric Heisig, Three East Cleveland
Men Each Awarded $5 Million for Wrongful Murder Convictions, Cleveland
Com. (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2018/11/
three-east-cleveland-men-each-awarded-5-million-for-wrongful-murderconvictions.html; George Hunter, Lawsuit: Evidence Fake in ‘92 Murder; After 25
Years In Prison, Man Goes After City, Pair Of Detectives, The Detroit News,
July 13, 2018, at A1; Ian Duncan, Baltimore Poised To Pay $9M To Man Who
Spent 20 Years In Prison On Wrongful Murder Conviction, Balt. Sun (Apr. 30,
2018, 3:45 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimorecity/bs-md-ci-wrongful-conviction-settlement-20180430-story.html; Logan
Bogert, Gov. Northam OKs Paying “Norfolk Four” $3.5M For Wrongful Rape, Murder
Convictions, The Virginian-Pilot (Apr. 2, 2018), https://pilotonline.
com/news/government/politics/virginia/article_94afa7b8-36d6-11e8-a34eb3006a8c7d94.html; Melissa Etehad, L.A. County To Pay $15 Million To Man
Wrongfully Convicted Of Murder, L.A. Times (Nov. 21, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://
www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ln-frank-oconnell-settlement20171121-story.html.
See, e.g., Sam Friedman, Judge Dismisses Fairbanks Four’s Lawsuit Against City
In Hartman Killing, Fairbanks Daily News-Miner (Oct. 23, 2018),
http://www.newsminer.com/fairbanks_four/judge-dismisses-fairbanksfour-s-lawsuit-against-city-in-hartman/article_7edd1bd0-d728-11e8-998b8fd1e1a28b55.html; Kansas man wrongfully imprisoned for 23 years receives no
compensation from state, CBS News: CBS This Morning (Mar. 3, 2018, 1:36
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kansas-man-wrongfully-imprisoned-
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Few would disagree that wrongful conviction is one of the
most grievous harms a member of society can suffer and that those
who are wrongfully convicted deserve to be compensated for those
injuries.10 Yet, large numbers of exonerees do not seek compensation
and, as explained in Section II, many file unsuccessful claims or
lawsuits for compensation. An empirical study of wrongful conviction
compensation can teach us valuable lessons about whether, how,
and why our remedial aspiration falls short and how we can improve
our country’s civil justice response to criminal justice failure.
The first part of that study was described in my 2017 article,
“An Empirical Reexamination of State Statutory Compensation for
the Wrongly Convicted.”11 There, I examined how the first 1,900
persons convicted in state courts listed in the National Registry
of Exonerations fared under the patchwork of state compensation
statutes that exist in this country.12 Based on that empirical study,
I proposed reforms that would improve these statutes’ distributive
fairness in ways sensitive to state budgetary concerns.13
Using the research methodology described in Section
I, this Article expands that study in several ways. First, the state
compensation data published in 2017 is updated, as new cases have
been filed and prior claims decided. One hundred more exonerees
were added to the database, now consisting of the first 2,000
individuals exonerated following state court convictions recorded in
the Registry, and data for those exonerees was updated to September
16, 2018.
Second, this Article looks beyond the percentages of
exonerees filing for and winning or losing those claims that I
addressed in 2017. Using data gathered by the Registry and provided

10
11
12
13

23-years-no-compensation-from-state/; Reshad Hudson, Man Who Spent 30
Years On Death Row Has Not Received Compensation Following Wrongful Conviction,
RocketCityNow.com (Jun. 14, 2018, 6:43 AM), https://www.rocketcitynow.
com/news/local-news/man-who-spent-30-years-on-death-row-has-notreceived-compensation-following-wrongful-conviction/1239276752:
Geraldine Sealey, Not Every Exonerated Man Gets Repaid, ABC News (Aug. 8,
2017), https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90978&page=1.
See Erik Encarnacion, Backpay for Exonerees, 29 Yale J.L. & Human. 245
(2017).
Jeffrey S. Gutman, An Empirical Reexamination of State Statutory Compensation for
the Wrongly Convicted, 82 Mo. L. Rev. 369 (2017).
Id. Hereafter, the National Registry of Exonerations is referred to as the
“Registry.” Nat’l Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.
edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx.
Gutman, supra note 11, at 421–37.
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by states, we explore another meaningful measure of the fairness of
these statutes: the proportion of years lost in prison for which state
compensation was awarded. In popular imagination, the exonerated
are viewed as spending decades in prison; the reality is different.
Significant numbers of those listed on the Registry were incarcerated
for no or relatively little time. It is important to ask, then, what
proportion of that lost time was subject to a compensatory award.
As described in detail in Section III, as of the time of this
writing, the state statutory compensation data shows the following:
•
•
•
•

•

Just under 53% of exonerees convicted in states with
compensation statutes filed for compensation.
Of those filers, 73.5% prevailed on their claims, 17.6%
lost, and the remaining 8.9% of claims are pending.
Since 1989, states have paid $545 million in wrongful
conviction compensation pursuant to state statutes, an
average of less than $20 million annually.
The average annual amount paid to prevailing exonerees
is just over $70,000 per year, an amount that would
be considerably lower were it not for Connecticut, the
District of Columbia, and New York, which had or still
have statutes which do not cap damages.14
Nearly half of the years lost by exonerees convicted in
states with compensation statutes were uncompensated.

Third, this Article examines federal civil rights and state tort
cases arising from wrongful conviction. It analyzes, also by state,
whether the same set of 2,000 exonerees filed such cases and, if so,
the results of them. With respect to the 1,802 of those exonerees
who were incarcerated, that data reveals the following:
•

14

15

Almost 45% of the exonerees (808 in total) filed federal
civil rights and/or state tort lawsuits15 arising out of their
wrongful conviction.

Only Maryland, New York, and West Virginia have statutes that are entirely
uncapped. M.D. Code Ann., State Fin. & Proc. § 10-501 (West 2019);
N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 8-b (McKinney 2019); W. Va. Code Ann. §
14-2-13a (West 2019). If the exoneree files a judicial claim for damages rather
than petitions the District administratively, the damages are uncapped. D.C.
Code Ann. §§ 2-421(1), 2-423 (West 2019).
For convenience, these will be referred to as “civil compensation” suits.
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•
•

•
•

Of those filers, 448, or 55%, received some monetary
recovery; 217 (or 27%) were unsuccessful. The remaining
143 lawsuits are pending.
Since 1989, those wrongly convicted who were
incarcerated recovered over $1.7 billion from governments
or state actors (or their insurers) as a result of verdicts or
settlements in civil compensation suits.
The average amount awarded for each year of
imprisonment was just under $305,000.
Exonerees were compensated in civil compensation suits
for only 32% of the total years lost.

Fourth, this Article combines state statutory compensation
and civil compensation filings for those incarcerated and draws the
following conclusions regarding the overall compensatory landscape:
•
•
•
•
•

Of the 1,802 incarcerated exonerees, 62% (1,210) sought
some form of compensation.
Of those who sought compensation, 70% (846) received
it.
In sum, 42% of the 1,802 incarcerated exonerees studied
received compensation.
Over $2.2 billion has been paid by states and municipalities
in wrongful conviction compensation to those exonerees.
Just under 60% of all years lost were compensated
through state statutory or civil compensation recoveries.

Fifth, having sketched the big picture, our study asks a more
fundamental question: what particular factors or characteristics
appeared to be associated with higher rates of filing for and receiving
state statutory and civil compensation and with higher amounts of
compensation received per year of incarceration in civil compensation
cases? Fortunately, many of those characteristics are recorded by the
Registry. The ones we tested are detailed in Section I.D and include
race and gender, whether the exoneree was aided post-conviction by
a conviction integrity unit or an innocence organization, whether the
exoneree pled guilty, was sentenced to death or exonerated by DNA
evidence, the causes of the wrongful conviction, the crime for which
they were wrongly convicted, the state and region of the country of
conviction and the number of years lost to wrongful imprisonment.
This Article sets forth the results of regression analyses of the data
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to reveal the sometimes expected and sometimes surprising truths
behind the factors that drive wrongful conviction compensation.
As a threshold matter, one might expect that the likelihood
of filing a state statutory compensation claim or a civil compensation
lawsuit would turn, at least in part, on the likelihood of prevailing
and the range of expected awards. The data shows that to be trueto a point. The percentage of exonerees wrongly convicted in states
with a no-fault compensation statute was higher than the percentage
of exonerees filing more costly and difficult federal civil rights cases
requiring proof of unconstitutional government misconduct, and the
likelihood of prevailing on a state compensation claim was higher
than on civil compensation claims. The duration of the wrongful
incarceration was positively associated with rates of filing.
At the same time, because most state statutes have annual or
total compensatory caps, or both, the expected outcome in successful
state statutory compensation cases is generally more certain and, as
it turns out, much lower than that in civil compensation cases. And,
somewhat counterintuitively, there seems no particular correlation
between the rates of filing state compensation cases and the
generosity of the state’s statute.
We supposed that there could be a correlation between gender
and race and the likelihood of filing and prevailing on state statutory
compensation and civil compensation claims and the average annual
amount received in successful civil compensation cases. Within the
2,000-person database, there were far higher numbers of exonerated
men than women and larger numbers of exonerated AfricanAmericans than other racial groups. The average number of years
lost to wrongful conviction was higher for African-Americans than
whites, and double for males than females.
We found that males consistently filed and won claims
at higher rates than women and received higher average civil
compensation awards, but the regression analyses show that gender
does not explain those differences. Interestingly, African-Americans
filed and won state and civil compensation claims at higher rates
than whites, but received lower civil compensation awards per year
of incarceration. But, the regression analyses also showed that these
differences were not associated with race, except that we found a
positive association between being Hispanic and higher annual civil
compensation awards compared to whites and African-Americans. In
a criminal justice system marred by racial disparity, there is perhaps
some comfort to be taken that race appears not to affect the rates
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of filing and prevailing in cases seeking compensation for wrongful
conviction and the results of those efforts.
We did, however, find a consistent and clear statistical
association between two particular factors and the likelihood of filing
and prevailing on state and civil compensation claims. Those exonerees
who were assisted in their efforts to obtain post-conviction relief
and exonerations by innocence organizations and those exonerated
as a result of DNA analysis were substantially more likely to file and
win state statutory compensation and civil compensation cases than
those unaffiliated with innocence organizations or those exonerated
by evidence other than DNA. In addition, as one might expect from
the legal requirement in civil rights cases that unconstitutional
government conduct cause the wrongful conviction, we found an
association between cases involving official misconduct and higher
rates of filing and winning civil rights cases.
Geography plays an extremely important and troubling role
in understanding wrongful conviction compensation. The rates
of filing and prevailing in both state statutory compensation and
civil compensation cases vary widely by state. Similarly, there are
substantial differences by state in the average annual amounts received
per year of incarceration in both state statutory compensation and
civil compensation. The result is significant state-by-state differences
in the amount that a year of lost freedom is valued.
Dividing the map into regions (South, West, Midwest, and
Northeast) and politically (blue states voting for Clinton and red
states voting for Trump in 2016) reveals statistical associations
between those geographic realities and the compensation factors
studied. Very generally, states in the South and West and red states
are associated with lower rates of filing, lower rates of winning and
of lower civil compensatory outcomes. In a very real and unsettling
way, the likelihood and extent of compensation turns on geographic
fortuity-the state of wrongful conviction.
Finally, we offer another way of considering the fairness
of this compensatory system. Rather than looking at comparative
generosity by state, the focus instead is to consider the extent to
which substantial numbers seek either form of compensation, the
extent to which substantial numbers of claimants are awarded some
compensation and the extent to which a substantial percentage of
years lost to wrongful conviction is compensated.
In this way, the fairness of the system is viewed from the
perspective of what we call compensatory coverage-the notion that
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it is better for a system to compensate a greater percentage of injured
persons, and within that group, the most seriously harmed, than to
compensate a smaller group more generously. Because make-whole
compensation in cases of wrongful conviction is impossible, an
award reflects society’s acknowledgement of the harm and its moral
obligation to provide at least some measure of compensation. When
one looks at those elements of fairness, there is a good argument to
be made that the best state to be exonerated in is Mississippi.
I.

The Data Set and Data Gathering

A. The National Registry of Exonerations
The data set for this analysis is the 2,000 people listed on
the National Registry of Exonerations16 as of September 16, 2018,
who were wrongly convicted in a state or territorial court17 between
January 1, 1989 and May 3, 2017.18 It is generally premature to
evaluate compensation to those later exonerated.19 The compensation
data used in this Article is accurate as of October 1, 2018.
The Registry, created in 2012, is a joint research project of
the University of California at Irvine Newkirk Center for Science and
Society, the University of Michigan Law School, and the Michigan
State University College of Law.20 Registry staff study, analyze, and
report on the causes and trends of wrongful convictions. Widely
quoted and cited, the Registry is regarded as the country’s most
authoritative source of data on the subject.21
16
17
18

19
20
21

Nat’l Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Aug 8, 2018).
The 2,000 includes 16 persons exonerated in the District of Columbia, 6 in
Puerto Rico and 1 in Guam. For convenience, we refer to these collectively as
state court convictions.
The database used here excludes those 109 persons who were wrongly
convicted in a federal or military court. Nat’l Registry of Exonerations,
Milestone: Exonerated Defendants Spent 20,000 Years in
Prison 3 n.5, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/
NRE.20000.Years.Report.pdf.
After September 16, 2018, a small number of people exonerated prior to May
3, 2017, were added to the Registry. By necessity, they are excluded from the
database.
Nat’l Registry of Exonerations, supra note 16.
Jessica Pishko, No County for Innocent Men, D Magazine (May 15, 2018, 11:30
AM)
https://www.dmagazine.com/frontburner/2018/05/dallas-countyexonerations-innocent-conviction-integrity-unit/ (describing the Registry’s
data as the “gold standard.”). See Radley Balko, Report: Wrongful convictions have
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The Registry employs a definition of exoneration which
requires that an individual be officially declared innocent by an
authorized government official or agency or be relieved of the
consequences of a conviction by pardon, acquittal or dismissal of
charges on the basis, at least in part, of newly discovered evidence
of innocence:
Exoneration—A person has been exonerated if he or
she was convicted of a crime and . . . was either: (1)
declared to be factually innocent by a government
official or agency with the authority to make that
declaration; or (2) relieved of all the consequences
of the criminal conviction by a government official or
body with the authority to take that action. The official
action may be: (i) a complete pardon by a governor
or other competent authority, whether or not the
pardon is designated as based on innocence; (ii) an
acquittal of all charges factually related to the crime
for which the person was originally convicted; or
(iii) a dismissal of all charges related to the crime for
which the person was originally convicted, by a court
or by a prosecutor with the authority to enter that
dismissal. The pardon, acquittal, or dismissal must
have been the result, at least in part, of evidence of
innocence that either (i) was not presented at the trial
at which the person was convicted; or (ii) if the person
pled guilty, was not known to the defendant and the
defense attorney, and to the court, at the time the plea
stolen over 20,000 years from innocent defendants, Wash. Post (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/10/reportwrongful-convictions-have-stolen-at-least-20000-years-from-innocentdefendants/; Niraj Chokshi, Black People More Likely to Be Wrongfully Convicted
of Murder, Study Shows, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
cim/2017/03/07/us/Wrongful-convictions-race-exoneration.html; David G.
Savage, Registry tallies over 2,000 wrongful convictions since 1989, L.A. Times
(May 20, 2012), https://www.latimes.com/World/la-xpm-2012-may-20-lana-dna-revolution-20120521-story.htm. The Registry was cited in Justice
Breyer’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Jordan v. Mississippi, 138 S.
Ct. 2567, 2571 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting), and in his dissent in Glossip v.
Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2757 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). It has been cited
in well over 200 law review articles. See also In The News, Nat’l Registry
of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
inthenews.aspx.
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was entered. The evidence of innocence need not be
an explicit basis for the official action that exonerated
the person. A person who otherwise qualifies has
not been exonerated if there is unexplained physical
evidence of that person’s guilt.22
In short, except for those cases in which one has been
declared factually innocent by a government official or agency with
authority to do so, such as through an award of a pardon on express
grounds of innocence or the grant of a certificate of innocence,
without some new evidence of innocence, there is no exoneration.
The post-conviction disclosure of unlawfully withheld Brady
material, the recantation of trial testimony, or new DNA analysis of
forensic evidence may be new evidence of innocence not presented
at trial. An acquittal following a reversal or vacatur of a conviction
on procedural grounds, in contrast, may not serve as the basis of
an exoneration if no new evidence of innocence was presented at
retrial.23
The Registry does not include those cleared of an offense,
but who participated in “a lesser crime that involved the same
conduct.”24 It excludes any case in which a defendant pled guilty to
any charge that is factually related to the original vacated conviction.25
The Registry also excludes “mass” or “group” exonerations, which
are typically cases of large-scale police perjury or corruption which,
when uncovered, result in non-individualized vacaturs of convictions

22
23

24

25

Glossary, Nat’l Registry of Exonerations, https://www.law.umich.
edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited March 14, 2019).
Obviously, those who fail to satisfy the Registry’s definition of exoneration
are not precluded from seeking compensation. An unintended byproduct of
researching claims or lawsuits filed by those on the Registry was finding both
successful and unsuccessful efforts to obtain compensation by others not listed.
When found, I alerted the Registry. Its subsequent review resulted in some
additional cases being added to the Registry; others did not satisfy its criteria.
There are some people who have obtained state statutory compensation or
civil compensation who are not in the Registry because they do not satisfy its
criteria, but those people are not included in this analysis.
Samuel R. Gross & Michael Shaffer, Exonerations in the
United States, 1989–2012 Report by the National Registry of
Exonerations, 1989–2012 Report, Nat’l Registry of Exonerations
7
(2012),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/
exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf.
Id.
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of the apparent victims of such misconduct.26
The Registry acknowledges that it has not listed all
exonerations because it does not learn about all of them.27 It largely
relies on public and media reporting, information from potential
exonerees or their attorneys, and reports from the Innocence Project
and local innocence network members.28 The extent to which
exonerations are uncovered in particular states depends on the
length and depth of reporting by sources in those states. Many other
exonerations likely result from the work of prosecutor’s offices rather
than professional exonerators and are less likely to be publicized.29
Moreover, exonerations of serious crimes, like murder and
rape, and the subsequent release of those who served many years in
prison are more likely to be reported by the press or to the Registry
than less dramatic cases involving lesser crimes and less time of
unjust imprisonment.30 Even so, as innocence programs have grown
and publicized their work, and as the press increasingly covers
wrongful conviction stories, the “capture rate” of exonerations has
likely increased over time. The database used for this study is that of
the Registry, even though the Registry’s recorded exonerations are a
subset of all exonerations and not a representative sample of them.31

26

27
28

29

30
31

The Registry has uncovered fifteen group exonerations involving at least
1,840 people, the vast majority of whom were framed for drug offenses.
Samuel R. Gross et al., Race and Wrongful Convictions in the
United States 20–26 (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Documents/Race_and_Wrongful_Convictions.pdf.
Gross & Shaffer, supra note 24, at 91–101.
See Samuel Gross, Conviction Integrity Units, Innocence
Organizations and the Time It Takes the Registry to List
Exonerations (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
ex o n e r a t i o n / D o c u m e n t s / C o n v i c t i o n % 2 0 I n t e g r i t y % 2 0 U n i t s , % 2 0
Innocence%20Organizations%20and.pdf (attributing the growing number
of cases the Registry learns about promptly to innocence organization and
conviction integrity unit publicity).
Id. at 2. See Samuel Gross, What We Think, What We Know and What We Think
We Know About False Convictions, 14 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 753, 758-63 (2017)
(explaining why it is impossible to uncover all wrongful convictions and why
many are not publicized).
See Gross, supra note 29, at 762–67 (the numbers of known exonerations
increase as the severity of the crime and sentence does).
Gross & Shaffer, supra note 24, at 96–101 (the exonerations the Registry
finds out about are the ones with the most press publicity; “Judging from the
few exonerations we happened to learn about despite their near-invisibility,
there are many others that we have missed.”).
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B. Methods of Compensation
There are two principal ways the wrongly convicted may be
compensated, which, in eight states, are at least partially mutually
exclusive.32 First, an exoneree can seek compensation pursuant to a
state statute, which exists in thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia.33 These statutes do not require the plaintiff or claimant
to demonstrate that their wrongful conviction was the result of
government misconduct; they are no-fault statutes.34 However,
they generally require the plaintiff or claimant to show factual
innocence.35 How that may be done and the burden of proof required
to demonstrate innocence varies widely among the states.
Following post-conviction relief, some of these statutes
require a civil suit to be filed in a state trial court,36 while others call on
32

33

34
35
36

In eight states, receipt of state compensation requires a waiver of other claims
arising from wrongful conviction against states, state instrumentalities, and
state employees. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-102uu(g) (2019); Fla. Stat. §
961.06 (2019); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 661B-7 (2018); Iowa Code § 669.8
(2018); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 650.058 (2018); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. § 103.153(b) (West 2017); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-195.12(B) (2018);
Wash. Rev. Code § 4.100.080 (2019). In Colorado and Michigan, a recipient
of state compensation must reimburse the state if there is a subsequent civil
compensation award. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-3-114 (6) (2019); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 691.1755 (13) (2018). In Minnesota, the converse is true-a
subsequent civil compensation award is to be offset by the amount received
from the state pursuant to the state compensation statute. Minn. Stat. §
611.365 Subd. 5 (2019). No state statute bars the award of state compensation
if there is an initial civil compensation award.
Compensation Statutes: A National Overview, Innocence Project (2007),
https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Adeles_
Compensation-Chart_Version-2017.pdf. The most recent state to have
adopted a compensation statute is Kansas, which passed a statute in May
2018. H.B. 2579, Kan. State Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Kan. 2018), http://
www.kslegislature.org/li_2018/b2017_18/measures/hb2579/. Because it
is so recent, I have not included Kansas exonerees in my analysis of state
compensation claims.
Gutman, supra note 11, at 370.
See id. at 371.
Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.
The District of Columbia has a procedure whereby a petitioner may seek
compensation from a state trial court or from an administrative agency. D.C.
Code § 2-421 (2017). Florida has a hybrid system in which a petition for
status as a wrongfully incarcerated person is filed with the original sentencing
court, but certain claims are heard by an administrative law judge, subject to
court review. Fla. Stat. § 961.03 (2017).
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claimants to file claims with a state court of claims or claims board.37
Other states require a filing with a state administrative entity.38 In yet
others, particular forms of post-conviction relief, sometimes issued
in a civil proceeding, such as an award of a certificate of innocence or
a finding of being a wrongfully convicted person, yield an essentially
automatic compensatory award made by a court or administrative
body without an explicit requirement to bring a separate civil or
administrative action in which factual innocence must be proven
again.39 In a small number of states, awards by such entities are
subject to legislative review and/or an affirmative legislative grant
of compensation.40
Second, the wrongly convicted may file federal civil rights
cases pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against counties, other
municipalities, and state actors such as prosecutors, police officers,
and/or state experts or others alleged to have engaged in forms of
unconstitutional misconduct that caused the wrongful conviction.41
In addition, or alternatively, some exonerees have filed state common
law tort claims on theories such as false arrest, false imprisonment,
or malicious prosecution.42 I have separately recorded and coded
claims for state statutory compensation and for suits under civil
rights or tort theories.
37
38

39

40

41
42

Connecticut, Michigan, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
Alabama (Division of Risk Management), Maryland (Board of Public
Works), Montana (Department of Corrections), North Carolina (Industrial
Commission), Oklahoma (Office of Management and Enterprise Services,
Risk Management Division), Texas (Comptroller).
California, Illinois, and Utah. In Minnesota, once a court declares the petitioner
eligible for compensation, the person then files a claim for compensation with
the state Supreme Court. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611.363 (West 2017); Back v.
State, 902 N.W.2d 23, 26–27 (Minn. 2017) (describing statutory scheme).
Alabama, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, and Utah. A relatively
small number of exonerees in a state without state compensation statutes
received compensation through private legislative bills or through state tort
claims procedures. Virginia has a compensation statute, but the mechanism
by which compensation is award is purely legislative. Va. Code Ann. §
8.01-195.10, 11 (2010). The database records known unsuccessful legislative
efforts to receive compensation in Virginia and elsewhere as denials.
A small number of exonerees filed Federal Tort Claims Act cases against the
United States or Bivens cases against officials arising from federal involvement
in the wrongful conviction.
A fair number of malpractice cases, some successful, were filed by exonerees
against their attorneys. Although some of those were filed against state or
county public defenders’ offices or attorneys, those malpractice claims were
excluded from this study because most did not involve a government entity.
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A few people have been compensated in other ways. I
identified one exoneree who received compensation (and one who
did not) through a general state tort claims process in Arkansas, a
state that does not have a compensation statute. A few people have
received compensation through a legislative process in states that
did not have relevant statutes at the time of compensation-five in
Georgia and one in Kansas (which now has a statute).43 In other
states, legislatures compensated exonerees by private bill before
the state enacted a state compensation statute. In such cases, the
legislative awards were included with statutory awards.
C. Research Methodology
Data reflecting the claims made under state compensation
statutes and the results of those claims are relatively accessible.
Some states post online decisions made by administrative bodies
or courts of claims that resolve claims for state wrongful conviction
compensation or the amounts paid to particular exonerees.44 Other
states responded to informal or formal public records requests for
such information.45 In some states, such as Alabama, California,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas,
academic researchers and investigative journalists have published
articles on state compensation.46 In addition, one can track bill
histories in states, such as Alabama, California, Illinois, and Virginia,
which require legislative action to pay compensation claims (or
decide not to do so). Over time, there also has been increased press
reporting of the award or denial of state compensation claims. All
told, while I may have missed some older claims, I believe that the
data set is substantially complete and accurate.
Determining whether a federal civil rights or state tort
43

44

45
46

I have noted those eight claims in brackets in Spreadsheet 1, but did not add
them in the totals. I included them in overall Spreadsheet 2. As a result, you
will see a minor difference in between Spreadsheet 1, infra, Column P and
Spreadsheet 2, infra, Column D.
These include California, Louisiana, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and
Wisconsin. Among those, a small number of states may not post the results
of cases going back to 1989. California’s online records dates from 2005 and,
while efforts were made to obtain older records, it is possible that some claims
were missed.
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas,
Washington, and West Virginia.
See Gutman, supra note 11, at 388 n.122.
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claim was filed was more challenging because that effort required
an exoneree-by-exoneree approach rather than a state-by-state
study. The Registry, the Innocence Project, Witness to Innocence,47
and media reporting provided substantial amounts of information
about whether such a lawsuit had been filed and the results of it.
Some records of settlements and verdicts were found on LEXIS.
Some settlements were located by reviewing county or city council
meeting action documents in cases requiring settlement approval. I
filed dozens of Freedom of Information Act and other public records
requests and contacted many of the attorneys litigating these cases.
These efforts uncovered most, but not all, settlements.
Some states, like Louisiana, and certain counties have particularly
restrictive laws and policies regarding the release of confidential
settlement agreements. In others, the relevant municipality did not
have the agreement because a private firm, under contract with the
insurer, represented it. In a number of cases, there was evidence
of an agreement, but it had been destroyed by the municipality or
plaintiff ’s counsel in accordance with record retention practices,
generally making older settlements harder to get than newer
ones. When possible, inquiries were made of counsel, but many
attorneys have left practice, did not keep a file, or stated that they
could not discuss the matter. Despite that, only 22 settlements
were undisclosed and, of those, six were associated with exonerees
incarcerated for two years or less.
Finding filed cases was one thing, but concluding that the
exoneree had not filed a lawsuit is a less certain enterprise. There is
no question that the substantial majority of exonerees who filed nonstatutory claims brought federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 rather than state tort claims, although many filed Section
1983 claims and supplemental state claims together. Virtually all of
the civil rights claims were filed in federal court, or were removed
to federal court.
As a result, PACER, LEXIS, and Bloomberg searches within
the federal judicial district encompassing the county of conviction
permitted reasonable conclusions that federal cases were unfiled.
When possible, state and county online docket searches were made
to determine whether a relevant case had been filed in state court. At
the same time, online searches of this kind have inherent limitations.
PACER dockets frequently do not extend prior to 1999. State court
47

Witness to Innocence, https://www.witnesstoinnocence.org/.
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docket searches are sometimes spottier. Some dockets do not extend
as far back as 1989. A few states and counties lack free online search
options and demand high fees for searches. In cases of uncertain
filing, Google searches for press reporting were performed.
Moreover, online searches are highly name sensitive. If an
exoneree changed their name, if different spellings were used, if
the name was unusually common, or if the lawsuit were brought by
an estate executor or other fiduciary, a case might be missed. It is
entirely possible that some cases were in fact filed by exonerees but
were coded as “unfiled.”
D. The Coding
I adopted a fairly simple coding method for each exoneree.
For exonerees wrongly convicted in a state which has a compensation
statute, I recorded whether the individual filed a state compensation
claim under the state statute.48 If not, I identified the case as falling
within one of three categories: (1) the exoneree was not incarcerated,49
(2) the individual might yet file a claim as the applicable statute of
limitations had yet to run (labelled “premature”), or (3) the exoneree
did not file a claim.
For those who did file a claim, three results were possible:
(1) the claim was dismissed or denied, (2) the claim was granted,
or (3) the claim remained pending for judicial or administrative
determination.50 If the claim was granted, I recorded the amount
awarded.51 On occasion, conflicting or uncertain data regarding the
48

49

50

51

As noted, a few exonerees received compensation by states without a state
compensation statute, typically through a general state claims statute or
by private legislative bill. I excluded those awards from my study of state
statutory compensation, but included them in evaluating total compensation.
I labeled them as “0 timers.” Generally, state statutes do not permit “0
timers” to recover compensation. There is, however, one exoneree in Texas
who served no time and was compensated for the time listed on the state’s
sex offender registry. There is also one exoneree in Illinois who served no
time, but received a certificate of innocence and, thus, an entitlement to some
non-monetary assistance. For consistency, I excluded those awards from the
calculations.
For purposes of this study, I did not distinguish among involuntary dismissals
or denials, such as those decided on the merits, those dismissed on procedural
grounds and those dismissed voluntarily for strategic or other reasons. It was
sometimes, but not always, possible to discern the basis or reason for the
denial or dismissal.
Texas exonerees receive monthly annuity amounts in addition to a lump sum
award. The Texas data includes annuity payments received until February 1,
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amount of the award required a measure of judgment. My typical
approach was to err on the side of the more generous award in cases
of uncertainty and, when clearly stated in the award, to deduct the
amount awarded as attorney’s fees or costs. The resulting amounts,
to the extent possible, track the money received by exonerees, rather
than amount paid by states, but it is likely that many of the other
awards recorded included attorney’s fees. They were not deducted
because there was no clear statement of the amount.52
Naturally, over time, the number of premature and pending
claims will decline and the number of unfiled and decided claims
will increase. The numbers that are compiled in Spreadsheet 1
are therefore a snapshot, but one with the substantial majority of
codings being determinate rather than subject to future decision.
The coding for federal civil rights or torts cases was nearly
identical. Each of the 2,000 cases were coded, including those of
exonerees who were not incarcerated after wrongful conviction.
Of the 2,000 exonerees, 198 served no prison time. Of those not
incarcerated after wrongful conviction, only 35 filed federal civil
rights and/or state tort cases and 17 were successful. They recovered
about $6.5 million. To reduce the size and complexity of Spreadsheet
2, I have excluded data about non-incarcerated exonerees from it.
They are, however, accounted for in the statistical analysis that
follows.
If there was no evidence that a federal civil rights or state
tort claim was filed, one of two codes was used: that the case was
“unfiled” because I could conclude with some certainty that the
statute of limitations had run on any claim arising from an order
vacating or reversing a criminal conviction, or that the case was
“premature” because the applicable statute of limitations had not
52

2018.
I have obtained some anecdotal information regarding particular state
statutory awards that were not fully paid. There are a number of reasons that
this might occur. In a small number of states, Alabama being an example, the
legislature has the authority to appropriate payments over time and budgetary
issues may prevent or delay certain out-year payments. In other cases, also
typically involving installment payments, payments may be discontinued when
particular eligibility requirements are no longer met, such as if the exoneree
dies or is convicted of a subsequent crime. Nonetheless, it was not possible
to track whether full payments were made to each exoneree awarded state
statutory compensation. Thus, the entire amount was recorded as the award.
As a result, it is more accurate to say that the database lists compensatory
awards, rather than compensatory receipts. This may slightly overstate the
amount of compensation actually paid.
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yet expired.
If a case had been filed, it was coded in one of three ways:
(1) dismissal or verdict for defendant, (2) settlement or verdict
for plaintiff, or (3) pending. On occasion, judgment was required
to determine whether the civil compensation claim arose from a
wrongful conviction. In a small number of cases, almost exclusively
those brought by people who served very little or no time, the case
focused on physical injuries suffered during the course of the arrest.53
I excluded such cases, although in a few of them, damages were
claimed (and awarded) for the arrest through wrongful conviction.
In case of doubt, and without a means for apportioning a judgment
or settlement between injuries suffered during arrest and injuries
arising from wrongful conviction, I erred on the side of recording the
entire judgment amount.54
Dismissals were coded as a denial regardless of whether the
dismissal was the result of a judicial determination of the claim
on the merits, a verdict for the defendant or defendants at trial,
or a dismissal of the civil case on procedural grounds. A voluntary
dismissal was a signal that there might have been a settlement and
that possibility was researched, but when no evidence of a settlement
was uncovered (often following a conversation with counsel), the
voluntary dismissal was coded as a denial. When federal claims
were dismissed and supplemental state claims dismissed without
prejudice or remanded to state court, efforts were made to determine
whether there were further state court proceedings and, if so, to
record the results of them.
Many cases involved some mixed result. Not surprisingly,
with significant frequency, courts dismiss certain claims but not
others, and/or dismiss claims against certain defendants but not
others. I coded a single case status as follows:
•
53
54

If there was a judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant,
and the result was on appeal but still undecided, the case

See, e.g., Brandon Lewis, Other Arizona Cases, Nat’l Registry of
Exonerations (Jun. 25, 2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4450.
Again, I heard anecdotally of a small number of cases in which there was
evidence that a judgment, sometimes a default judgment, was entered against
a state actor, but that the judgment was not paid, often as a result of the
failure or refusal of the relevant municipal entity to indemnify the state
employee. Nevertheless, I recorded the full amount of the award or judgment
given difficulties in accurately determining which were fully paid.
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•
•

•

•
•

was coded as “pending.”
If there was a dismissal of some claims or some
defendants, but the litigation continues, the case was
coded as “pending” not a “denial.”
If there was a dismissal of some claims and/or some
defendants, but the litigation concluded with a partial
settlement for the plaintiff, the case was coded as an
award for the plaintiff, not a “denial.”
If there was a settlement on some claims or a settlement
with some defendants, but the litigation continues,
the case was coded as an award for the plaintiff, rather
than “pending,” and the settlement amount to date was
recorded, but with a note to continue to follow the case.
A small number of cases, particularly in New York, were
settled before filing. Nonetheless, I coded those cases as
filed with an award to the plaintiff.55
Some federal civil rights cases are brought by multiple
defendants wrongly convicted in the same incident.
When a verdict or settlement was reached in favor of
the plaintiffs, it was sometimes possible to learn the
per-plaintiff amounts and those were recorded. In other
cases, that distribution is confidential and I divided the
total award equally by the number of plaintiffs.

In addition, I recorded for each exoneree four categories
of data maintained by the Registry. First, the Registry records the
race and gender of the exoneree.56 We will call these Bio Factors.
Second, because I hypothesized that they might be relevant to
compensation, I noted the presence or absence of three of several of
the characteristics that the Registry calls “Tags”57:

55
56

57

Obviously, prefiling settlements are hard to find unless there is some publicity
about them.
When reviewing case documents and researching potential exonerations, the
Registry attempts to determine the race of the exoneree. Racial classifications
are often difficult and, here, particularly so in properly classifying whether an
exoneree is Hispanic. Despite potential inaccuracies, we have adhered here to
the Registry’s racial categorizations.
The Registry has a defined set of characteristics that it calls “Tags.” The
Registry’s “Tags” are listed on its website and defined there as well. Nat’l
Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
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Whether the exoneree was helped by a prosecutor’s
office’s conviction integrity unit (CIU);
Whether the exoneree pled guilty to the crime for which
they were wrongly convicted;
Whether the exoneree had the assistance of an innocence
organization during their effort to obtain post-conviction
relief (IO).58

In addition, I recorded two additional potentially relevant
characteristics noted by the Registry:
•
•

Whether DNA analysis was central in securing the
exoneration and, thus, recorded on the Innocence
Project’s website;59
Whether the exoneree was sentenced to death.60

Third, the Registry records and we noted the worst crime for
which each exoneree was wrongly convicted. The Registry places
these crimes in one of six “crime” categories: murder, sexual assault,
drugs, child sexual abuse, robbery, and other. Fourth, we used the
Registry’s identification of “Contributing Factor Codes.” The study
of each exoneree’s case led the Registry to determine whether
any of the following factors (some exonerees had more than one)
contributed to the wrongful conviction:
•
•
•
58

59

60

Whether the exoneree made a false confession;
Whether there was a mistaken witness identification;
Whether false or misleading forensic evidence was

The Registry’s 2017 Report notes that for the last several years, most
exonerations were produced by “professional exonerators,” attorneys working
in CIUs and those associated with IOs, often in tandem. Nat’l Registry
of Exonerations, Exonerations in 2017 1, http://www.law.umich.
edu/special/exoneration/Documents/ExonerationsIn2017.pdf. As noted, this
reality will skew the complexion of the database as states with active IOs and
state counties with active CIUs record more exonerations than states with
fewer or no IOs and CIUs.
The Innocence Project has documented 365 exonerations through DNA
analysis. DNA Exonerations in the United States, Innocence Project https://
www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/
(last
visited Apr. 12, 2019).
A DNA exoneration or a death sentence are recorded as “Tags” in the Registry.
For convenience, they are added among our five “Tags” as a shorthand
recognizing that that term is not true to the Registry’s list.
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•
•
•

employed;
Whether witnesses perjured themselves or made false
allegations;
Whether there was official misconduct;
Whether there was an inadequate legal defense.

The Registry is mindful that some of these factors are
easier to discern than others. False confessions are almost always
mentioned in a report about the case, but because case reviews may
not surface other causes not explicitly raised in efforts to obtain
post-conviction relief, other hidden causes may be missed. This is
particularly true of inadequate legal defense, the frequency of which
cannot be accurately quantified.61 For that reason, the tables below
exclude this particular contributing factor.
In addition, since the Registry records the state of wrongful
conviction, we coded “Geo Factors” by dividing the states
geographically in terms used by the Census Bureau: South, West,
Northeast, and Midwest,62 and also noted each state as “red” (voting
for Trump in 2016) or “blue” (voting for Clinton in 2016).63
Finally, the Registry records “years lost” for each exoneree.
Years lost is generally the period of wrongful incarceration
calculated from the day of conviction to the day of release.64 Pre-trial
61
62

63
64

See Gross, supra note 29, at 773.
The Census Bureau groups all states into either the South, the West, the
Northeast, and the Midwest. The South contains Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. The West contains Arizona, Colorado,
Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, Alaska, California,
Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. The Northeast contains Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, New
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Finally, the Midwest contains Indiana,
Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, North Dakota,
Minnesota, South Dakota, and Missouri. Census Regions and Divisions of the
United States, United States Census Bureau, https://www2.census.gov/
geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf. Exonerees from Guam
and Puerto Rico are excluded from these geographic categories.
Because Puerto Rico and Guam are absent from the Electoral College, the
seven exonerees from those territories are excluded from the “red”/“blue”
analysis.
Longest Incarcerations, Nat’l Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/longestincarceration.aspx (last visited
Apr. 12, 2019). For a small number of exonerees who remain incarcerated after
exoneration on other crimes, the “years lost” ends on the date of exoneration.
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incarceration and post-release parole, probation, or time on a state
sexual offender registry is not counted.65
II. Why Do the Wrongly Convicted Lose Compensation Claims?
The focus of this empirical research has been to determine
how frequently the wrongly convicted are compensated, to catalog
the amounts received through settlement or adjudication and to
assess whether any particular factors explain the frequency and
extent of compensation. It is worth first flipping the question to
ask why-perhaps counter to one’s intuition-some exonerees seek
compensation but fail. The data shows that 146 state compensation
claims have been denied and that 217 incarcerated exonerees have
lost their civil compensation cases.
As noted, there are two paths to compensation-no-fault
state statutes and civil rights or tort claims. The potential roadblocks
between filing and compensation are very different in each. It is
beyond the scope of this article to catalog and analyze the cause of
failure in each case, but a general background can offer some insight
into why some are unsuccessful, why some might not be filed in the
first place and why some civil compensation cases settle for modest
amounts.
A. Why Do Claimants Lose State Statutory Claims?
In my 2017 article, I canvassed the enormous variation
among state statutes, both in terms of determining eligibility and in

65

Because this Article’s analysis accounts for “years lost,” it is important to
understand whether the Registry’s conviction to exoneration calculation
matches that of the state when it awards state statutory compensation.
Whether the state must calculate the exact amount of time a successful state
statutory compensation claimant served in prison depends on the metric
the state uses for deriving a calculation award. In many states, a precise
calculation is not made and the Registry’s “years lost” figure was used. A
number of states explicitly or implicitly include pre-conviction incarceration
time as part of their compensation calculus and thus could have a larger time
lost period than the Registry. Other states may use the same metric as the
Registry, but arrive at a different number. When the state’s compensation
award rested on a precise calculation and it differed from the Registry’s, I
used the state’s calculation. In short, the Registry’s lost years amount was
used unless the record showed a carefully calculated alternative amount. This
resulted in small adjustments for exonerees with state awards in Alabama,
California, District of Columbia, Florida, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina,
Ohio, and Texas.
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awarding compensation.66 Newer compensation statutes and recent
amendments to existing statutes tend to include fewer disqualifying
provisions and are more generous.67 The most recent statute adopted,
by Kansas, follows that trend and has been called a model statute.68
In Kansas, claimants file suit in state trial court and must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, four elements: that (1)
they were convicted of a felony and imprisoned, (2) the conviction
was reversed or vacated and either the charges were dismissed or
the claimant was retried and found not guilty, (3) that the claimant
did not commit the crimes for which they were charged, and (4)
that they did not cause or bring about their conviction, such as by
suborning perjury or fabricating evidence.69 A guilty plea or false
confession does not preclude a showing of the last element.70
If these elements are satisfied (and the court is expressly
afforded discretion to consider the difficulties of proof caused by the
passage of time, death or unavailability of witnesses and destruction
of evidence71), then the court must award $65,000 for each year
of incarceration and not less than $25,000 per year of post-release
parole, supervision or registration as a sex offender.72
Describing the Kansas statute, as comparatively progressive
as it is, offers insight into why at least some of the 17.5% of applicants
66
67

68

69

70
71
72

Gutman, supra note 11, at 385–97.
There are exceptions to that general trend. As noted, id. at 382–84, Connecticut
and the District of Columbia which had two of the most progressive statutes
recently amended them in ways that make them less generous and more
restrictive, but nevertheless remain among the best statutes.
Innocence Staff, Governor Signs Gold-Standard Wrongful Conviction Compensation
Law in Kansas, Innocence Project (May 15, 2018). https://www.
innocenceproject.org/governor-signs-wrongful-conviction-compensationlaw-kansas/.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5004(c)(1) (2019). The Nebraska Supreme Court
has described elements (2) and (3) as requiring a showing of legal innocence
and factual innocence, respectively. Hess v. State, 843 N.W.2d 648, 653 (Neb.
2014).
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5004(c)(1)(D) (2019).
Id. § 60-5004(c)(2).
Id. § 60-5004((e)(1). In addition, the court must award attorney’s fees and
may award non-monetary relief, including counseling, housing assistance
and personal financial literacy assistance. Id. § 60-5004(e)(4)(A)–(B). The
claimant is also entitled to tuition assistance and state health care benefits. Id.
§ 60-5004(e)(4)(C)–(D). The state is to be reimbursed from money received
in any earlier or later civil rights or tort claim arising from their wrongful
conviction. Id. at § 60-5004(f). If the court concludes that the claimant qualifies
for compensation, a certificate of innocence is issued. Id. § 60-5004(g).
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for state statutory compensation lose their cases. Given that these
are no-fault statutes which do not require proof of misconduct,
the number of unsuccessful claims may seem surprising. Part of
the answer lies with the basis upon which one may be listed in the
National Registry of Exonerations.
Simply because one has met the Registry’s definition of an
“exoneree” does not mean that one automatically satisfies state
statutory requirements that they demonstrate factual innocence.
Recall that one qualifies for the Registry on one of two grounds: if
one has been declared factually innocent or has been relieved of all
the consequences of the criminal conviction by pardon, acquittal or
dismissal of charges73 and the pardon, acquittal, or dismissal was the
result, at least in part, of new evidence of innocence. With respect
to the latter ground, a demonstration of factual innocence is not
required.74
A showing of factual innocence is a non-issue for those
seeking compensation who were earlier declared innocent by a court
or pardoning authority. Without such a pre-existing declaration, the
vast majority of state statutes that are specific on this point require
applicants for compensation to show by either clear and convincing
evidence75 or a preponderance of the evidence76 not only that the
charges against them were reversed, vacated, or dismissed, but also
that they were factually innocent of them. In Kansas and many other
73
74

75
76

This is similar to the Kansas element (2) described above.
The Registry’s definition is, thus, similar to that of West Virginia, which
permits compensation if the claimant’s judgment of conviction has been
reversed or vacated, and the accusatory instrument dismissed, or if a new trial
is ordered, he or she was found not guilty or ultimately not retried. W. Va.
Code § 14-2-13(a)(c)(2)(C) (2019). Factual innocence, or even new posttrial evidence of innocence, is not required. In Minnesota, one is eligible for
compensation if the conviction is vacated or reversed on grounds “consistent
with innocence” or if a new trial were ordered “consistent with innocence and
the charges were dismissed or the claimant was found not guilty. Minn. Stat.
§ 590.11, subd. 1 (2017); see also Ala. Code § 29-2-157 (2019). Connecticut’s
statute appears to depart most liberally from the Registry’s definition by
permitting compensation to persons whose convictions have been vacated or
reversed because of cited acts or omissions that constitute malfeasance or
other serious misconduct without requiring a showing of innocence. Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 54-102uu(a)(2)(B) (2019). In such states, then, it is possible
that state compensation can be paid to persons not on the Registry.
Colorado, District of Columbia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, Wisconsin.
California (by case law), Hawaii, Illinois, Mississippi.
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states, an acquittal after retrial is alone not enough to show that.
Almost half of those who lost state compensation claims
had sought relief in just two states: California and New York. The
substantial majority of those California denials issued at the time
of this writing77 rested in whole or in part on the claimant’s failure
to show factual innocence.78 Of the available New York Court of
Claims opinions denying claims, a fair number also faltered on the
innocence prong.79 A significant number of denials in other states
also followed a determination that the petitioner failed to prove
factual innocence; such was the case, for example, in every denial
in Louisiana and Wisconsin. In short, a substantial number of
people satisfy the Registry’s exoneration definition but are denied
compensation because they are found not to have met the state’s
statutory requirement of factual innocence.
Some other state compensation denials can be attributed
to quirks in state law or the interpretation of them. In Michigan,
for example, the statute provides that wrongful conviction
compensation claims may be filed in the state’s Court of Claims
within eighteen months of the enactment of the statute.80 The Court
of Claims, however, has in several cases applied a six-month notice
deadline generally applicable to Court of Claims filings, resulting in
several dismissals.81 In Ohio, the state Supreme Court interpreted a
somewhat idiosyncratic provision requiring a person seeking to be
designated as a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” to show an error
in procedure resulting in release to have occurred after sentencing
77
78

79
80
81

Cal. Victim Comp. Bd., Proposed Decisions, https://victims.ca.gov/board/
pc4900.aspx (as of Aug 8, 2018). The Board has posted a small number of
new decisions on its website since I completed this study.
As applied, the California Victim Compensation Board enforces the innocence
requirement rigorously, or, some would argue, overzealously. See Justin Brooks
& Alexander Simpson, Find the Cost of Freedom: The State of Wrongful Conviction
Compensation Statutes Across the Country and the Strange Legal Odyssey of Timothy
Atkins, 49 San Diego L. Rev. 627, 644 (2012).
Like some other states, both California and New York deny compensation to
those found to have caused or contributed to their convictions and several
denials were based on that rationale.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1757.7 (2019).
Rusha v. Dep’t of Corr., 859 N.W.2d 735 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (interpreting
the six-month notice requirement); Summary Disposition, Sadowski v. State
of Michigan, No. 18-00051-MZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. Jul. 30, 2018); see Ken Kolker,
‘Miscarriage of justice’: State fights wrongful conviction payments, WOOD-TV (May
16, 2018, 6:13 PM), https://www.woodtv.com/news/target-8/-miscarriageof-justice-state-fights-wrongful-conviction-payments/1183315375.
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or during or after imprisonment, rather than before or during trial.82
The claims of several of the heirs of the “Wilmington 10” in North
Carolina were denied because the eventual exoneree died before
exoneration.83
All that said, many denials were based on procedure, rather
than substance. Wrongful conviction compensation claims are not
immune from dismissal for pleading errors, statute of limitations
problems, and other avoidable procedural mistakes. Some run into a
post-filing statutory bar, such as the claimant’s death or subsequent
criminal conviction. In addition, some dismissals were voluntary and
rested on grounds that compensation advocates would not regard
as worrisome. For instance, there are cases that appeared to have
been dismissed as a part of a global settlement of parallel civil rights
claims.
B. Why Do Civil Rights Plaintiffs Lose?
The vast majority of cases filed outside the context of state
statutory compensation are brought under federal civil rights
theories. Obviously, both procedurally and doctrinally, federal civil
rights cases arising from wrongful conviction are far more complex
and uncertain than claims under no-fault state wrongful conviction
compensation statutes.84 These cases typically involve multiple
legal theories against multiple defendants, including municipalities,
prosecutors, police officers, forensic experts, and defense attorneys.85
82

83
84

85

Mansaray v. State, 6 N.E.3d 35, 37 (Ohio 2014). See Editorial, Do right, Ohio,
by those wrongfully convicted, Akron Beacon J. (May 16, 2018), https://www.
ohio.com/akron/editorial/editorials/beacon-journal-ohio-com-editorialboard-do-right-ohio-by-those-wrongfully-convicted. This glitch has been
corrected. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West 2019).
Estate of Jacobs v. State, 775 S.E.2d 873, 874–75 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
See Encarnacion, supra note 10, at 248; Gutman, supra note 11, at 372 n.11.
Indeed, this Article shows that a significantly higher percentage of those
seeking state statutory compensation were successful than those filing federal
civil rights or torts claims.
The substantial majority of these cases are filed against state municipalities
and employees. Some, however, advance claims against the United States
or federal employees because of their alleged involvement in the wrongful
conviction. See Bunch v. United States, 880 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2018) (describing
Federal Tort Claims Act case against United States arising from claim that
federal forensic chemist was alleged to have fabricated evidence); Engel v.
Buchan, 710 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2013) (concerning a Bivens claim against
FBI agent alleged to have fabricated evidence and violated Brady); Limone v.
United States, 579 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing FTCA claims against
the United States for suppressing evidence undermining key prosecution
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Commonly, these claims are narrowed as motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment result in rulings dismissing some
(or all) of the claims and parties. Doctrinally, these cases involve
the complicated intersection of civil claims for damages arising from
unconstitutional acts or omissions during a criminal prosecution.86
From a coding perspective, when a civil rights case is coded as a
denial, it means that the case failed in its entirety. Conversely, when
it is coded as one in which there was a recovery, either at trial or,
more commonly, in settlement, that does not exclude the likelihood
that some claims and/or parties were dismissed voluntarily or by
court order prior to the resolution of the litigation. In short, coding
of plaintiff recoveries in civil rights cases lacks nuance; it fails to
reflect the dismissals of some claims and/or parties that preceded
the recovery.
It is outside the purview of this article to comprehensively
survey each of the civil rights theories raised in these cases, the
many defenses to them, or to catalog why some succeed and others
fail. But, it is helpful to generally understand the typical theories
and the defenses to them. That understanding offers insight into
why many exonerees do not file them, why a significant number fail
and why, in some cases, arguable weakness in these claims results in
relatively modest settlements.
As lawyers think through whether and how to frame federal
civil rights theories for exonerated clients, their point of departure is
the innocence of their clients. The strategic focus then is to determine
why their clients were wrongly found guilty. In some cases, guilt was
established by plea and may, for example, have been the product
of a coerced confession or the withholding of exculpatory evidence.
In others, a finding of guilt followed a trial and lawyers may trace
the source of important evidence presented to the jury to police
fabrication, suggestive identification procedures, or other forms of
police misconduct. In yet other cases, exculpatory or impeachment
evidence known to the government was concealed from the defense.
To be sure, not every wrongful conviction is the result
of unconstitutional misconduct.87 In a number of sexual assault
86
87

witness).
Brandon Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error and Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005
Wis. L. Rev. 35, 38 (2005).
Innocence Project, Making Up for Lost Time: What the
Wrongfully Convicted Endure and How to Provide Fair
Compensation 12 (2009) (“In most cases, there is no intentional
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cases, for example, the only evidence against the defendant was an
erroneous cross-racial witness identification by the victim and flawed
forensic evaluation of hair samples. Without evidence that the error
was the result of unconstitutionally suggestive police identification
procedures, or that the forensic analysis was intentionally fabricated
or mischaracterized at trial, there is no basis for a federal civil rights
claim.88 It also goes without saying that a wrongful conviction may
have been the result of unconstitutional acts or omissions, but as
years pass evidence is lost and proving it may become increasingly
challenging.
It is very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to know whether
those exonerees who did not file a compensation claim did not
do so because a competent lawyer, reviewing the record, found
no existing evidence of unconstitutional or tortious misconduct
causing the conviction and thus no basis to bring such a suit.89 The
non-filing may, alternatively, be the result of any number of other
reasons: lack of access to an attorney, an erroneous conclusion by
counsel that no viable claim existed, a reluctance of the exoneree to
litigate, post-exoneration criminal activity resulting in incarceration
and attendant difficulties in bringing suit,90 statute of limitations
problems, post-exoneration death and a disinclination of the estate
to pursue a claim, or a short wrongful incarceration suggesting, at
best, a modest recovery.

88

89
90

misconduct that caused the wrongful conviction, or at least, none that can be
proven.”).
Official misconduct was not found to be a contributing factor to the wrongful
conviction in nearly half of the exonerations listed in the National Registry. See
Exonerations in the United States Map, Nat’l Registry of Exonerations,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-theUnited-States-Map.aspx (last updated Mar. 22, 2019). To see the number
of state exonerees whose wrongful convictions were due in part to official
misconduct, click the “non-federal” toggle and then the “present” button next
to official misconduct on the right side of the page.
In contrast, in those states in which receipt of state statutory compensation
requires the waiver of all other claims against any prospective defendant
arising from the wrongful conviction, the reason for non-filing is obvious.
While the popular impression of an exoneration features an innocent person
leaving prison for good, there are, in fact, a substantial number of cases in
which an exoneree remains incarcerated as a result of an unchallenged
conviction on other crimes or, sadly, is imprisoned as a result of postexoneration crimes. Neither necessarily precludes a compensation claim
arising from the wrongful conviction, but continued incarceration may make
finding counsel more difficult and may reduce both the chances of prevailing
and the monetary value of the case.
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Generally, federal Section 1983 civil rights claims are premised
on the twin notions that certain acts or omissions of government
actors, rising to the level of the violation of constitutional norms,
deprived the exonerated plaintiff of a fair criminal trial,91 and that
this official misconduct was the cause of the wrongful conviction
and subsequent damages.92 So understood, these types of claims
spawn obvious potential defenses on the merits: that the record
lacks plausible evidence of misconduct, that the alleged misconduct,
if it occurred, did not rise to the level of a due process violation or
that it was not the factual or legal cause of the conviction because
other facts, evidence or witnesses, untainted by misconduct, explain
why the conviction occurred.93
Professor Brandon Garrett has categorized several types of
constitutional violations that have been claimed to cause a wrongful
conviction. In practice, however, there are often not sharp boundaries
between them. How they are articulated in court decisions depends
on how lawyers frame them. There is also some blur in how they are
defended; for instance, there is frequently overlap between defenses
on the merits and immunity defenses.
First, wrongly convicted plaintiffs have claimed that the
government’s violations of Brady v. Maryland,94 which held that
principles of due process require that favorable and material evidence
91
92

93

94

Garrett, supra note 86, at 54–55.
Framing the issue at this level of generality ignores the complex and largely
unresolved questions regarding the nature and definition of the required
causal connection between the wrongful act or omission and the wrongful
conviction. See Teressa Ravenell, Cause and Conviction: The Role of Causation in
§ 1983 Wrongful Conviction Claims, 81 Temp. L. Rev. 689 (2008). Professor
Ravenell’s article describes and anticipates part of the causation question
later decided in Drumgold v. Callahan, 707 F.2d 28, 48–54 (1st Cir. 2013).
There, the First Circuit overturned a jury award in a Section 1983 claim based
on a Brady violation. It held that the district judge erred in issuing a jury
instruction permitting the jury to find liability if the suppression of evidence
was a “substantial factor” or concurrent cause of the wrongful conviction. Id.
at 53–54. Instead, the Court held that the district judge should have given the
jury a “but for” factual causation instruction, a more difficult standard for the
plaintiff to meet.
Of course, other defenses are made in many of these cases. A fairly common
one is the statute of limitations. As a threshold matter, Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994) requires the civil rights plaintiff to prove that his or her
criminal conviction or sentence has been set aside. See also Poventud v. City of
New York, 750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014).
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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known to prosecutors or police be furnished to criminal defendants,95
caused their wrongful conviction.96 Generally, to prevail on a Brady
claim in this context, “a plaintiff must show that (1) the evidence
was favorable to him; (2) the officer concealed the evidence97; and
(3) the concealment prejudiced him.”98
Favorable evidence may be exculpatory, such as evidence
suggesting the criminal involvement of a third party, or impeachment
evidence, such as evidence of the unreliability of a prosecution
witness.99 Evidence is material when there is “any reasonable
likelihood” it could have “affected the judgment of the jury.”100
The plaintiff does not need to show it is more likely than not that
they could have been acquitted at trial had the suppressed evidence
been disclosed. Instead, they must show that failure to disclose the
evidence is sufficient to “undermine confidence” in the verdict.101
As a matter of practice, Brady claims are often added to
lawsuits challenging specific forms of police misconduct, such as
overly suggestive witness identification techniques or fabrications
of inculpatory evidence.102 The Brady claim is that these acts
See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995)).
96 Garrett, supra note 86, at 70; Drumgold, 707 F.3d at 38. The Circuits are split
on whether and to what extent there is a Brady right to exculpatory evidence
prior to a guilty plea. Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 392–93 (5th
Cir. 2018) (collecting cases from the circuits).
97 Generally, there is no Brady claim for suppression of evidence if the evidence
is known to the defendant. See Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 847 F.3d at 443,
443–44.
98 Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 343 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted);
see Poventud, 750 F.3d at 133; see also Mills v. Barnard, 869 F.3d 473, 485–86
(6th Cir. 2017).
99 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
100 Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1006 (2016) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
101 Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012); Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys Office,
767 F.3d 379, 397 (4th Cir. 2014).
102 See Gates v. District of Columbia, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2014) (if the
police fabricated a confession to a snitch and failed to disclose it to prosecutors,
they would have violated Brady); Avery, 847 F.3d at 443 (police violate Brady
when they withhold the coercive techniques employed to threaten witnesses);
see Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 744 (6th Cir. 2006) (separating
claims of fabrication from Brady claim as to forensic scientist); see also Mills,
869 F.3d at 473. But see Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir.
2015) (Brady does not require police to create exculpatory evidence by
requiring them to disclose fabrication of evidence to the prosecutor); Ajamu
v. City of Cleveland, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123362, at *12–13 (finding Avery
95
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of misconduct, known to the police, were not disclosed to the
prosecutor. It is not possible to bring civil Brady claims against
prosecutors because the Supreme Court, in a line of cases since
Imbler v. Pachtman, has held that absolute immunity shields them
against claims challenging conduct “within the scope of his duties in
initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.”103
Absolute immunity does not apply when the prosecutor
is sued for investigative or administrative acts.104 However, that
exception has been held inapplicable to claims that managing
prosecutors failed to train and supervise prosecutors on their Brady
obligations and failed to establish an information database recording
impeachment material on jailhouse informants.105
In addition to proving a violation of Brady, the plaintiff must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence a causal connection
between it and the conviction. Common law tort principles generally
inform the causation inquiry.106 In this context, materiality and
and Saunders-El difficult to reconcile).
103 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976). See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S.
118 (1997) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune from claims that affidavit
supporting application for arrest warrant contained false statements); Buckley
v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 277 (1993) (holding prosecutor absolutely
immune from claims arising from statements made to press); Burns v. Reed,
500 U.S. 478 (1991) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune from claims
arising from application for search warrant and presentation of evidence
before grand jury). See Karen McDonald Henning, The Failed Legacy of Absolute
Immunity Under Imbler: Providing a Compromise Approach to Claims of Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 48 Gonz. L. Rev. 219 (2012) (arguing for modification of
doctrine); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 53 (2005) (same).
104 The courts are split on whether absolute or qualified immunity, or neither,
may apply to claims that the prosecutor knowingly used fabricated evidence
at trial. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 1994); Michaels
v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (absolute immunity applies);
Zahrey v Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 354 (2d Cir. 2000) (qualified immunity
applies); Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that
a prosecutor did not have absolute or qualified immunity where he fabricated
evidence).
105 Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009); see Martin A. Schwartz,
The Supreme Court’s Unfortunate Narrowing of the Section 1983 Remedy for Brady
Violations, 37 The Champion 58, 59–61 (May 2013). In Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51 (2001), the Supreme Court held that a municipality may be liable
for damages under Section 1983 only when it is deliberately indifferent to
actual or constructive knowledge that its prosecutors have been inadequately
trained on their Brady obligations.
106 Drumgold v. Callahan, 707 F.3d 28, 48 (1st Cir. 2013).
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causation are closely connected. Materiality requires a showing
of a reasonable probability that the plaintiff would not have been
convicted but for the withholding of evidence. Causation requires
the plaintiff to make the same “but for” showing by a preponderance
of the evidence, a heightened burden of proof.107
Some Circuits apply a more stringent standard for plaintiffs to
meet in making Brady-based civil rights claims. In the Fourth Circuit,
the plaintiff must show, among other factors, that the officer’s failure
to disclose Brady material to the prosecutor was in bad faith.108 In the
Eighth Circuit, plaintiffs must show that the officer both knew of
the exculpatory value of the evidence and suppressed it in bad faith
with the intention of depriving the defendant of a fair trial.109 In the
Eleventh Circuit, plaintiffs must show that the Brady violation was
more than the product of negligence.110
Noting inter-Circuit differences in just this one area of the
law underscores a broader, and obvious reality. While it is impossible
to quantify, differences in the legal standards, and how they are
applied from district to district and circuit to circuit, surely have an
important but indeterminate role in the empirical data. The state of
the law in a particular district or circuit, when not uniform across the
country, naturally influences whether potential civil rights plaintiffs
bring particular claims, which they bring, and how successful they
are.
Whether a plaintiff ’s Brady claim can survive a motion for
summary judgment depends largely on the facts. The standards
articulated above suggest reasons why a plaintiff may fail to prevail
on such claims. The court may conclude, for example, that the
suppressed evidence was immaterial,111 that it was cumulative of
107 Id. at 48–54 (reversing verdict based on jury instruction that erroneously
incorporated notions of both but for and concurrent causation).
108 Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attys. Office, 767 F.3d 379, 396–97 (4th Cir. 2014)
(reversing dismissal of such claims).
109 Briscoe v. Cty. of St. Louis, 690 F.3d 1004, 1013 (8th Cir. 2012) (granting
motion for summary judgment on Brady claim); Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d
976, 979–81 (8th Cir. 2004) (same).
110 Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1305–08 (11th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit
requires the officer to have failed to disclose Brady material to prosecutors
with deliberate indifference or reckless disregard of the defendant’s rights.
Tennison v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2009)
(finding standard satisfied).
111 See Lefever v. Ferguson, 645 F. App’x. 438, 443–44 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding
forensic scientist’s lie about graduation date, combined with other matters,
was not material as nondisclosure did not undermine confidence in the trial).
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known evidence,112 that its nature did not permit a reasonable jury
to draw a causal connection to the wrongful conviction,113 or that
it failed to meet the enhanced standards in the Fourth, Eighth, or
Eleventh Circuits.114
Unlike prosecutors, police officers are subject to civil Brady
claims,115 but such a claim may fail on qualified immunity grounds.
The doctrine of qualified immunity was crafted to “balance[] two
important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable
when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably.”116 Qualified immunity shields
the government actor from liability when their conduct “does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.”117 Overcoming a qualified
immunity defense is, therefore, a tall order; as the Supreme Court
has said, immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.”118
Determining the applicability of qualified immunity involves
a two-part analysis. Officials are entitled to qualified immunity
unless they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right and the
unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly established at the time.”119
“Clearly established” means that, at the time that the government
112 Hernandez v. Terrones, 397 F. App’x. 954, 970–74 (5th Cir. 2010); Lefever, 645
F. App’x. 438.
113 Johnson v. Mahoney, 424 F.3d 83, 91 (1st Cir. 2005).
114 See Porter, 483 F.3d at 1305.
115 See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, at 280–81 (1999); Whitlock v.
Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 587–88 (7th Cir. 2012); Johnson v. Dossey, 515
F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 2008); Steidl v. Fermon, 494 F.3d 623, 627–32 (7th
Cir. 2007); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2007); Gibson
v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 411 F.3d 427, 442–43
(3d Cir. 2005) (“Several courts have recognized that police officers and other
state actors may be liable under § 1983 for failure to disclose exculpatory
material to the prosecutor.”), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006); Villasana v.
Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 978 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1183 (2005);
Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 2001); Schwartz, supra note
105, at 61.
116 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
117 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam) (quoting Mullenix v.
Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).
118 Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)).
119 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018) (quoting Reichle
v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)).
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official acted, or chose not to act, the law was “‘sufficiently clear’ that
every ‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing’”
is unlawful.120 The law at issue must, therefore, be clear enough to
be defined at a high degree of specificity and that it admits to only
one reasonable interpretation within the circumstances faced by the
official.
Thus, in the context of Brady, the qualified immunity question
turns on whether the protection was violated, an issue that may well
have been resolved during post-conviction proceedings, and whether
the obligation to disclose the evidence was “clearly established” at
the time. Naturally, that will depend on the particular nature of
the alleged suppression of evidence and when it occurred. Varying
factual scenarios have led to different results.121
Second, plaintiffs have alleged that their due process rights
to a fair trial were violated when the police used unduly suggestive
witness identification techniques that resulted in witnesses wrongly
identifying the plaintiff as the perpetrator of a crime.122 The Supreme
Court has held that due process concerns may be implicated
when particular identification procedures are both suggestive and
unnecessary.123 Even when that threshold is met, however, automatic
exclusion does not follow.
Instead, courts will assess whether improper procedures
created a “substantial likelihood of misidentification.”124 Where the
120 Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2012) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
121 Mellen v. Winn, 900 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing dismissal of Brady
claims); Drumgold v. Callahan, 707 F.3d 28, 43–45 (1st Cir. 2013) (rejecting
defense); compare Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46–49 (1st Cir. 2011)
(accepting defense in part because in 1972 it was not clearly established that
Brady applied to officers) with Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attorney’s Office,
767 F.3d 379, 399–401 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting defense); Carrillo v. Cty. of
L.A., 798 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming rejection of qualified immunity
defense); Tennison v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1093–95
(9th Cir. 2009) (same).
122 Garrett, supra note 86, at 78–87. To some degree, this claim may overlap with
Brady. The plaintiff may allege that the police failed to disclose to prosecutors
that they employed suggestive techniques. Cf. Carrillo, 798 F.3d at 1228
(denying qualified immunity).
123 Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2012) (citing Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977)).
124 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201. In Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 2010),
cert denied, 562 U.S. 840 (2010), however, the Fifth Circuit held that the
“substantial likelihood of misidentification” prong is no bearing on the
analysis because the wrongly convicted are, by their nature, misidentified.
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“indicators of [a witness’] ability to make an accurate identification”
are “outweighed by the corrupting effect” of law enforcement
suggestion, the identification should be suppressed.125 Thus,
courts will determine, based on a totality of the circumstances,
whether a suggestive and unnecessary identification procedure was
nevertheless reliable,126 or, instead, made the trial unfair.127 Again,
whether the plaintiff bringing such a claim can surmount a motion
for summary judgment will depend on how the court frames the
question and the evidence developed through discovery.128
Third, plaintiffs have alleged that their due process rights
were violated when police coerced their confessions. Of the 2,308
state wrongful conviction cases in the Registry of Exonerations
recorded as of the spring of 2019, 292 involved false confessions.
Exoneration makes clear that the confession was false, but a civil
rights plaintiff must show that the confession was a result of
unconstitutional coercion.129 The Supreme Court has held that
principles of due process and the Fifth Amendment privilege130
against self-incrimination require a confession to be voluntary before
it may be admitted into evidence.131 The Court’s focus has been
on due process and it has held that the question of voluntariness
depends on “whether a defendant’s will was overborne,” requiring
an evaluation of the totality of circumstances, including “both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.”132
125 Perry, 565 U.S. at 229 (quoting Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 114).
126 Lee v. Foster, 750 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2014). Whether the identification
was potentially reliable in the criminal context should have no bearing in a
civil rights case based on the innocence of the plaintiff. Innocence should take
reliability out of the civil liability equation. Garrett, supra note 86, at 88.
127 Alexander v. City of South Bend, 433 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 2006).
128 Id. at 552 (granting summary judgment); Hicks v. City of New York, 232 F.
Supp. 3d 480, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (granting motion to dismiss), aff ’d in part,
vacated in part, 719 F. App’x 61 (2d Cir. 2018) (affirming the dismissal on the
basis of Brady but vacating the dismissal of defendant’s malicious prosecution
claims). Hicks v. Marchman, 719 F. App’x. 61 (2d Cir. 2018) (granting motion
to dismiss); Hampton v. City of Chicago, No. 12-cv-5150, 2017 WL 2985743
at *23–24 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2017).
129 Garrett, supra note 86, at 90.
130 Tinney v. Richland Cty., 678 F. App’x. 362, 365 (6th Cir. 2017) (affirming
dismissal of self-incrimination claim on qualified immunity grounds when
it was unclear whether a violation of the right against self-incrimination can
occur without a trial).
131 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000).
132 Id. at 433–34 (quoting Schenkcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973));
see Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 304 (3d Cir. 2014).
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This totality of the circumstances test is an uncertain one
because “the line between proper and permissible police conduct
and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a
difficult one to draw, particularly . . . where it is necessary to make
fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures
and inducements on the mind and will of an accused.”133 Not
surprisingly, then, the success of such a claim depends largely on the
facts.134
Fourth, plaintiffs have argued that, in violation of principles
of due process, prosecutors,135 police or, less commonly, forensic
scientists testifying for the state, fabricated evidence which led to
their wrongful conviction. The language describing the required
causal connection between the fabrication and the conviction is not
entirely consistent, but is reasonably forgiving.136
Uncovering evidence of fabrication, often decades after the
misconduct, is challenging. But, when it is found, fabrication can form
the basis of a powerful claim and render qualified immunity defenses
difficult. Fabrication violates clearly established constitutional
rights: “[w]e emphatically reject the notion that due process of law
permits the police to frame suspects.”137 The unconstitutionality of
fabrication is typically found to have been well-established prior to
133 Halsey, 750 F.3d at 304 (quoting Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515
(1963)).
134 Id. at 306–09 (reversing summary judgment for defendants); Livers v. Schenck,
700 F.3d 340, 352–54 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming denial of qualified immunity);
Tinney, 678 F. App’x. at 367 (affirming judgment against plaintiff alleging that
police knowledge of his mental illness when obtaining a confession shocked
the conscience). The Seventh Circuit has held that coercive interrogation of
witnesses or inducing them to lie is not a violation of the defendant’s due
process rights because their testimony may be true; the violation, if any, is
one resting on Brady-the failure to disclose the tactics used to obtain the
testimony. See Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 847 F.3d 433, 439 (7th Cir. 2017).
135 In Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2014), the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the denial of absolute immunity to a prosecutor alleged to have fabricated
evidence as an investigator prior to indictment.
136 Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294 n.19 (“reasonably likely”); Mills v. Barnard, 869 F.3d
473, 484 (6th Cir. 2017) (“a reasonable likelihood that the false evidence
could have affected the judgment of the jury”) (citation omitted); Avery, 847
F.3d at 439 (convictions “premised” on fabricated evidence always violate
Due Process). In Massey v. Ojanlit, 759 F.3d 343, 354–56 (4th Cir. 2014), the
Fourth Circuit employed a “but for” standard of causation and, affirming the
dismissal by the trial court, held that it was not met.
137 Halsey, 750 F.3d at 293; see Whitlock v. Brueggerman, 682 F.3d 567, 580–87
(7th Cir. 2012) (denying qualified immunity defense).
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the fabrication at issue in these cases.138
It is appropriate at this point to make another simple but
important observation. Civil rights law in the area of wrongful
conviction changes over time; claims that were not viable in 1990
may be more viable today, or vice versa. For example, a number of
cases were dismissed in the Seventh Circuit when courts held that
police fabrication of evidence does not violate a defendant’s federal
civil rights, but that is no longer the law of the circuit.139 In contrast,
Connick v. Thompson made future Monell claims much more difficult in
the Brady context.140 Just as the law is not the same from circuit to
circuit, it changes over time and necessarily influences which cases
are brought and which are successful.
Fifth, plaintiffs have brought what are traditionally tort claims
for malicious prosecution as Section 1983 claims arising under the
Fourth Amendment. Generally, the elements of such a claim are (1)
“that a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and
that the defendant ‘ma[d]e, influence[d], or participate[d] in the
decision to prosecute’”, (2) “that there was a lack of probable cause
for the criminal prosecution”, (3) “that, ‘as a consequence of a legal
proceeding,’ the plaintiff suffered a ‘deprivation of liberty’ . . . apart
from the initial seizure”, and (4) that “the criminal proceeding must
have been resolved in the plaintiff ’s favor.”141 On the merits, the
difficulty in some of these cases is in satisfying the lack of probable
cause prong.142
Last, in addition to suing individuals, wrongfully convicted
138 Mills, 869 F.3d at 486–87. The Seventh Circuit has held, for example, that,
since 1988, it has been well-established in that Circuit that police fabrication
of evidence which is later used to convict a defendant is unconstitutional.
Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580.
139 See Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2015).
140 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011).
141 Mills, 869 F.3d at 479–80 (quoting Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir.
2010)) (reversing dismissal of such claims); cf. Black v. Montgomery Cty., 835
F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir. 2016) (adding requirement that the “defendant acted
maliciously for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice”); see
Montoya v. Vigil, 898 F.3d 1056, 1066–68 (10th Cir. 2018) (holding that the
termination of criminal proceedings in plaintiff ’s favor was not satisfied when
vacatur of conviction was the result of compromise unrelated to innocence).
142 See Tinney v. Richland Cty., 678 F. App’x. 362 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that
an indictment satisfies probable cause, court affirms summary judgment on
grounds that officers had absolute immunity from claims of false testimony
at grand jury); Massey v. Ojanlit, 759 F.3d 343, 357 (grand jury had probable
cause to indict notwithstanding officer’s false statements).
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civil rights plaintiffs frequently sue municipalities or other local
governments. Typically called “Monell” claims after Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Services,143 these claims are not subject to qualified
or absolute immunity defenses.144 However, local governments
are not vicariously liable for the misconduct of their employees.145
Instead, the municipality itself must cause the deprivation of the
plaintiff ’s constitutional rights.146
To show that, the plaintiff must identify an action or custom
rising to the level of official municipal policy that caused or was
the “moving force”147 behind their injury.148 The Supreme Court has
held that an official municipal policy “includes the decisions of a
government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and
practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the
force of law.”149 Moreover, the plaintiff “must show that the policy
was implemented with ‘deliberate indifference’ to the ‘known
or obvious consequences’ that constitutional violations would
result.”150
These alleged policies or customs can, in effect, be affirmative
or negative151 in nature. For example, in the Brady context, plaintiffs
may contend that the prosecutor’s office had a policy or custom of
failing to disclose Brady material, that the office had a practice of
failing to train employees on their Brady obligations or that it failed
to supervise them in efforts to comply with them.152 In any case,
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657, (1980).
Connick, 563 U.S. at 60 (1991) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989).
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60–61. Sometimes, this requires a
determination of whether the government actor is acting on behalf of the
municipality or the state, a decision that is based on state law. McMillian v.
Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 797 (1997). If the actor is making policy for the
state, rather than for a municipality, the actor is not susceptible to suit under
Section 1983.
150 Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(finding no deliberate indifference); see also Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 407 (1997).
151 Lisker v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV09-09374, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48184
(C.D. Cal. 2013), aff ’d 780 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2015) (denying motion for
summary judgment on Monell claims that LAPD had a policy of failing to
respond to citizen police complaints and disciplining police, thereby enabling
officers to fabricate evidence against the plaintiff).
152 See, e.g., Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2010)
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these claims are often very difficult to win. The plaintiff must show
not only that unconstitutional misconduct caused their wrongful
conviction, but that the misconduct was part of a broader custom
or policy which, presumably, resulted in other wrongful convictions
as well.
Some Monell claims rest not on affirmative and unconstitutional policies, but on the municipalities’ failure to train or
supervise officers on proper ones. The Court has, however, described
as “tenuous” claims that a failure to train amounts to an official policy
or custom.153 To make that showing, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that municipal decision makers either knew or should have known
that training was inadequate but were “deliberately indifferent” to
the effect that inadequacy might have on the constitutional rights
of citizens.154 Deliberate indifference can generally only be shown
when the government policymaker is aware or should be aware
of a pattern of similar violations caused by the failure to train or
supervise.155 If the plaintiff can surmount that formidable burden,
he or she must, of course, also prove that the wrongful conviction
would not have occurred had the municipality properly trained or
supervised its employees.
III. What Is The Data and What Does It Tell Us?
Having explained our research methodology and the bases
upon which claimants or plaintiffs may not win wrongful conviction
compensation claims, we have a context for better understanding
(affirming summary judgment for municipality on claim that it failed to train
forensic scientist); Alexander v. City of South Bend, 433 F.3d 550, 557 (7th
Cir. 2006) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Monell
claim regarding policy of suggestive identifications); Reasonover v. St. Louis,
447 F.3d 569, 584 (8th Cir. 2006) (granting defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on Monell claim alleging failure to train on Brady obligations); Bailey
v. City of New York, 79 F. Supp. 3d 424, 443, 454 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (denying
motion for summary judgment on Monell claim involving failure to train on
Brady obligations).
153 Thompson, 563 U.S. at 61.
154 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). See also Bd. of the Cty.
Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 410 (“’deliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of
fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his action.”)
155 Compare Thompson, 563 U.S. at 61, 63 (rejecting a single Brady violation as
establishing deliberate indifference) with City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391
(hypothesizing a scenario in which deliberate indifference can be inferred
after a single incident).
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the data. Any exoneree, whether incarcerated or not, can file a
federal civil rights or state tort claim. Of the 2,000 potential civil
compensation filers in the database, 1,802 were incarcerated and 198
were not imprisoned.156 All are reflected in the first two data columns
in Tables 1 and 2. In contrast, only those wrongly convicted in states
with compensation statutes and subsequently incarcerated may file
for state statutory compensation. The third and fourth columns
in Tables 1 and 2 reflect that, of the 1,802 incarcerated exonerees,
1,572 were convicted in states that now have compensation statutes
(except Kansas) and 230 were convicted in states without them
(including Kansas).
Table 1 lists the numbers and percentages of total exonerees,
total incarcerated exonerees, and incarcerated exonerees convicted in
states with and without compensation statutes by race and gender.157

156 The wrongfully convicted who are not sentenced to prison are a somewhat
surprising percentage of those on the Registry. Cf. Samuel R. Gross,
Contributions: Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudications, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 999 (2018)
(discussing exonerations of those convicted of misdemeanors). Because of
its size and the possibility that readers might be less concerned about them,
compared to those wrongly imprisoned, we have tried in several tables to
separate this subgroup out from the full cohort of 2000.
157 The percentages have remained quite constant according to the most recent
data from the National Registry. Exonerations in the United States Map, supra note
88.
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Table 1 (Exonerees by Race and Gender)
Bio
Factors

Race

Total
Exonerees

Count

(%)

Incarcerated
Exonerees

Incarcerated Incarcerated
Exonerees
Exonerees
in States
in States
with Comwithout
pensation
CompensaStatutes
tion Statues

Count

Count

(%)

(%)

Count

(%)

Asian

16

0.80

13

0.72

11

0.70

2

0.87

Black

952

47.60

893

49.56

805

51.21

88

38.26

Caucasian

771

38.55

678

37.62

561

35.69

117

50.87

Hispanic

240

12.00

200

11.10

182

11.58

18

7.83

Native
American

12

0.60

10

0.55

6

0.38

4

1.74

Other

9

0.45

8

0.44

7

0.45

1

0.43

Total

2000

100

1802

100

1572

100

230

100

Gender

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

Female

186

9.30

134

7.44

116

7.38

18

7.83

Male

1814

90.70

1668

92.56

1456

92.62

212

92.17

Total

2000

100

1802

100

1572

100

230

100

The overwhelming majority of exonerees in our database are
male, and African-Americans make up the largest racial group of
exonerees. In contrast, among the population of exonerees convicted
in states without compensation statutes, there are more whites than
blacks.158 The absence of compensation statutes in seventeen states
thus affects more whites than blacks.
Table 2 sets forth the numbers and percentages of exonerees
and incarcerated exonerees by the “Tags,” “Contributing Factors,”
“Worst Crimes,” and “Geo Factors” described above.

158 The Registry has studied race in wrongful convictions. See Gross et al., supra
note 26.
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Table 2 (Exonerees by Other Characteristics)
Total
Exonerees

Incarcerated
Exonerees

Incarcerated Incarcerated
Exonerees
Exonerees
in States
in States
with Comwithout
pensation
CompensaStatutes
tion Statues

Tags

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

CIU

240

12

160

8.88

158

10.05

2

0.87

No CIU

1760

88

1642

91.12

1414

89.95

228

99.13

GP

424

21.2

307

17.04

290

18.45

17

7.39

No GP

1576

78.8

1495

82.96

1282

81.55

213

92.61

IOA

400

20

395

21.92

345

21.95

50

21.74

No IOA

1600

80

1407

78.08

1227

78.05

180

78.26

DNA Ex.

346

17.3

345

19.15

303

19.27

42

18.26

No DNA
Ex.

1654

82.7

1457

80.85

1269

80.73

188

81.74

DP

117

5.85

117

6.49

96

6.11

21

9.13

No DP

1883

94.15

1685

93.51

1476

93.89

209

90.87

Contributing
Factors

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

FC

248

12.4

239

13.26

211

13.42

28

12.17

No FC

1752

87.6

1563

86.74

1361

86.58

202

87.83

MWID

611

30.55

596

33.07

527

33.52

69

30

No MWID

1389

69.45

1206

66.93

1045

66.48

161

70

F/MF

493

24.65

445

24.69

386

24.55

59

25.65

No F/MF

1507

75.35

1357

75.31

1186

75.45

171

74.35

P/FA

1109

55.45

1040

57.71

898

57.12

142

61.74

No P/FA

891

44.55

762

42.29

674

42.88

88

38.26

OM

931

46.55

872

48.39

773

49.17

99

43.04

No OM

1069

53.45

930

51.61

799

50.83

131

56.96
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Worst
Crime

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

Murder

799

39.95

795

44.12

674

42.88

121

52.61

Sexual
Assault

301

15.05

291

16.15

255

16.22

36

15.65

Drugs

218

10.9

130

7.21

123

7.82

7

3.04

Child Sexual Assault

240

12

228

12.65

201

12.79

27

11.74

Robbery

105

5.25

104

5.77

93

5.92

11

4.78

Other

337

16.85

254

14.1

226

14.38

28

12.17

Geo
Factors

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

Count

(%)

South

744

37.2

638

35.41

582

37.02

56

24.35

West

330

16.5

296

16.43

239

15.2

57

24.78

Northeast

413

20.65

386

21.42

322

20.48

64

27.83

Midwest

506

25.3

475

26.36

429

27.29

46

20

Red State
(2016)

1071

53.55

941

52.22

752

47.84

189

82.17

Blue State
(2016)

922

46.1

854

47.39

820

52.16

34

14.78

Chart Abbreviations
Definition
CIU

Conviction Integrity Unit

GP

Guilty Plea

IO

Innocence Organization Aid

Ex.

Exoneration

DP

Death Penalty

FC

False Confession

MWID

Mistaken Witness Identification

F/MF

False/Misleading Forensics

P/FA

Perjury/False Allegation

OM

Official Misconduct
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When considering the association between these
characteristics and compensatory outcomes, it is important to bear
in mind the frequency of the characteristics in the database. Tables
1 and 2 provide that background. We will soon see, for example,
that exonerees who were assisted in their efforts to obtain postconviction relief by innocence organizations and those exonerated
by DNA evidence are generally more likely to seek and receive state
statutory compensation and civil compensation. Yet, Table 2 shows
that innocence organizations aided only about 20% of the exonerees
in our database and DNA was responsible for the exonerations of
only 17.3% of them.
Of the contributing factors, more than half of the exonerations
featured perjury or false allegations while less than half involved
official misconduct. Murder, at 40%, was the most frequent crime for
which the exonerated were wrongly convicted. The most wrongful
convictions occurred in the South (37.2%), by a wide margin, and
the least occurred in the West (16.5%); they were fairly equally
divided between blue and red states.
With some exceptions, the frequency of the characteristics
studied among the exonerees in the full database generally mirror
the frequency of those features among those exonerated in states
without compensation statutes. One exception is for those sentenced
to death. While less than 6% (117) of all exonerees were sentenced
to death, 9% of those wrongfully convicted in states without
statutes received the death penalty. Another is that the absence of
compensation statues in certain states disproportionately impacted
persons convicted of murder: about 40% of the exonerees in the
database were wrongly convicted of murder, but over half of those
exonerated in states without statutes were convicted of murder.
The opposite is true for those wrongly convicted of drug offenses;
about 11% of all exonerees were wrongly convicted of drug offenses,
but drug offense exonerees accounted for only 3% of those wrongly
convicted in states without compensation statutes. The absence of
those statutes then more severely impacts those with more time
lost; the average number of years lost in state murder cases in fall
2018 was 13.3 years and only one year in drug cases.159
The percentages of exonerees from states without
compensation statutes was balanced among geographic regions.
The South, Northeast, and Midwest each have one state without
159 Exonerations in the United States Map, supra note 88.
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a compensation statute with substantial numbers of exonerees
(Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Indiana), while the West has a larger
number of lower-volume states without compensation statutes. And,
for those unable to escape red/blue politics, of all exonerees (except
Puerto Rico and Guam, which are not represented in the electoral
college) convicted in states without a compensation statute, nearly
82% were convicted in states carried by Trump in 2016, indicating
that states without statutes may, on balance, be more politically
conservative than those that do.
When looking at this data and that which follows, we should
be mindful of one significant quirk in the database. The majority
of wrongful convictions in drug cases arose from a single countyHarris County (Houston), Texas. In 2014, the conviction integrity
unit (CIU) in Harris County started uncovering significant numbers
of guilty pleas in drug possession cases in which the confiscated
evidence was not, in fact, a controlled substance.160 There are 145
such cases in the database of 2,000. This large cluster of drug
cases from a single state has several common characteristics:
incarcerations of one year or less (with two exceptions), CIU
involvement, guilty pleas, and almost no state compensation filings
(just one unsuccessful one). This cluster undoubtedly skews the
picture. That said, we have decided not to exclude them from the
database; they and others like them in other counties and other
states are listed in the Registry. We were reluctant to begin excluding
arguably non-representative clusters from the database for want of a
rational and consistent methodology for doing so. At the same time,
those drawing conclusions from this data should understand and
appropriately account for the presence of these cases.
As noted, the Registry records the number of years each
exoneree was wrongly imprisoned. Table 3 below lists the average
number of years lost for each racial group, for both genders, and for
the four geographic regions. The average number of years lost for
non-federal exonerees in the fall of 2018 was 9.2 years.161 The data
show that the average number of years lost is substantially higher for
blacks than for whites, Asians and Hispanics and more than twice as
high for men than for women. Whites averaged more years lost than
Hispanics. Those wrongly convicted in the Northeast and Midwest
160 Nat’l Registry of Exonerations, Exonerations in 2015 9–11 (Feb.
3,
2016),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/
Exonerations_in_2015.pdf.
161 Exonerations in the United States Map, supra note 88.
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experienced the longest average years lost, amounts larger than the
national average.

Table 3 (Mean Years Lost by Race, Gender, and Region)
162, 163

Race

Number

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Asian

16

6.63

7.37

Black

952

10.36

8.73

Caucasian

771

7.41

7.42

Hispanic

240

6.78

6.83

Native
American

12

10.23

6.62

Other

9

6.62

6.24

Female

186

4.38

5.91

Male

1814

9.20

8.21

South

744

8.34

8.78

West

330

7.59

7.25

Northeast

413

9.61

7.74

Midwest

506

9.35

7.93

P Value

<0.0001

Gender
<0.0001

Geo Factor

0.0011

A. The State Statutory Compensation Data
We turn next to data regarding claims made (or not made)
pursuant to state wrongful conviction compensation statutes and
the results of those claims. What can the data tell us about the
characteristics of those more likely to file and receive statutory
162 The standard deviation measures the amount of variation within a set of data.
A low standard deviation indicates that most the numbers are near the mean.
A high standard deviation means that the numbers are more spread out. If, for
example, the mean of a set of data were 10 and the standard deviation were
4, 68% of the observations would lie between 6 and 14 and 95% would be
between 2 and 18.
163 The P value from analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests whether there are
differences between groups. The null hypothesis of ANOVA is that all groups
have the same mean. If the P value is less than or equal to 0.05, we reject the
null hypothesis and conclude that not all group means are equal. Such is the
case here.
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compensation and any trends observed in filing?
In my earlier work, I hypothesized about why exonerated
incarcerees in states with compensation statutes do not file for
compensation.164 One was that many states adopted statutes during
the 1989–2018 period, and that some of those exonerated prior to
enactment of the statute do not seek compensation because, while
most statutes allowed such retroactive filings, the exoneree is unaware
of their opportunity to so. Another is that some exonerees whose
wrongful incarceration was brief do not file because the potential
gains outweigh the costs associated with the effort. Objective data
permits us to test these hypotheses.
First, using a Cochran-Armitage trend test,165 we wanted to
see if there was a relationship between the probability of filing for
state compensation and the year of exoneration (which is recorded
by the Registry). As expected, that relationship exists, as shown in
Figure 1. The width of the band in each figure represents the size of
the population within the band.

164 Gutman, supra note 11, at 395–97. An unfortunate reality of wrongful
conviction is the number of exonerees who commit crimes after exoneration.
A number of exonerees are also not released after exoneration because
they continue to serve sentences for crimes actually committed. We have
not determined the numbers of these cases or whether the time between
exoneration and re-conviction permitted a claim or suit to be filed. Future
research is needed to better assess how frequently subsequent convictions or
continued incarceration explains non-filing, but the anecdotal evidence I have
seen of this phenomenon is considerable.
165 The Cochran-Armitage trend test is a test of linear trend in the proportions of
the response of interest from a binary response across R ordered categories.
For example, we want to test the null hypothesis that the proportions of
compensation filings or awards were the same over several time bands versus
the alternative hypothesis that those proportions of awards increased across
the calendar time bands.
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Figure 1 (State Claims Made by Year of Exoneration)

Generally,166 Figure 1 shows that the proportion of incarcerated
exonerees seeking state statutory compensation has increased over
time. One possible explanation for this is that because the number of
state statutes has increased since 1989, more people are potentially
eligible and apply.167
However, virtually all states that have adopted statutes since
1989 either expressly permit retroactive compensation by allowing
pre-adoption exonerees to seek compensation or are silent on
retroactivity, but have been implemented as though it exists.168 Even
so, it stands to reason that a long period of time between exoneration
and state statutory adoption will reduce the number of claimants
as a result of death, subsequent disqualifying criminal activity, lack
166 The proportion decreased during the most recent period (2013–2017), perhaps
because a number of recent exonerees have not yet sought compensation.
167 Robert J. Norris, Exoneree Compensation: Current Policies and Future Outlook, in
Wrongful Conviction and Criminal Justice Reform: Making
Justice 289, 294–95 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014).
168 Iowa and Minnesota do not expressly bar retroactive claims, but none have
been made.
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of knowledge of the new statute, or a desire not to revisit their
wrongful conviction in a potentially adversarial claim. Thus, it is not
surprising that the trend of more filings is generally upward.
Second, Figure 2 shows a strong positive relationship
between years lost and the likelihood of filing. This accords with
one’s intuition that as the number of years lost grows, the exoneree
has a greater the need for financial and other support and the prospect
of a higher potential award from filing.169 Conversely, there are fewer
filings of those with relatively brief wrongful incarcerations.

Figure 2 (State Claims Made by Years Lost)

Spreadsheet 1 below updates the table appended to my
previous article.170 As my research continued, I learned about the
results of previously premature or pending claims, uncovered
previously unknown claims and the results therefrom, concluded
that certain previously premature claims should be recoded as
169 Gutman, supra note 11, at 396–97.
170 See id. at 439–40.
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unfiled due to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations
and corrected a few errors. Most significantly, a substantial number
of additional awards were made in New York, and I obtained updated
information about annual annuity payments paid to Texas exonerees.
Together, they accounted for the majority of the additional payments
made.
Otherwise, the state statutory compensation landscape
is relatively unchanged. Only one state, Kansas, has enacted a
new statute.171 Claims have been filed and decided in Michigan,
the last state to adopt a statute prior to Kansas. Florida amended
its compensation statute to relieve, in part, a prohibition on
compensation to persons previously convicted of a felony. Florida
exonerees are now eligible if they have one prior non-violent felony,
but that relaxation is not retroactive.172 Maryland exonerees no
longer require a governor’s pardon to qualify for compensation.173
Massachusetts made some positive reforms to its statute, including
raising the compensation cap from $500,000 to $1 million.174
Yet, the data remains concerning. Of 1,572 incarcerated
exonerees wrongly convicted in states with a compensation statute,
only 828 have filed compensation claims, or about 53% of exonerees
in those states. [Columns I and J]. That number will rise, but
not dramatically because there exist only 76 premature claims –
exonerees who might still file for state statutory compensation prior
to running of the statute of limitations.175 [Column F] About 42.5%
did not file and the applicable statutes of limitation make it too late
to do so.176 [Column H].
Of the 828 filings, 609, or about 73.5%, were granted, 148
(almost 18%) were denied and 73 (9%) remain pending. [Columns
L, M, N]. The total amount paid by states now exceeds $545 million
since 1989, or an average of $18.8 million per year. [Column P].
Compensated exonerees received an average of $69,000 per year of
171
172
173
174

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5004 (West 2019).
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 961.04 (West 2019).
Md. Stat. Ann. § 10-501(b)(2) (West 2019).
Compare Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258D, § 5 (West 2019), with Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 258D, § 5 (West 2017) (amended 2018).
175 Thirty-one of those premature claims are in Texas and, of those, the vast
majority are associated with exonerees who were wrongly convicted of drug
possession in Harris County, served relatively little time in prison and are
unlikely to file claims.
176 The remaining 5% of exonerees are coded “premature.”
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incarceration.177 [Column Q]. Those numbers would be significantly
lower were it not for New York. New York’s statute is uncapped; the
average amount paid per year of incarceration is over $148,000. New
York was the state of conviction of 14% of incarcerated exonerees,
but over 38% of all state statutory compensation paid in the nation
was awarded by New York.
Overall, only 38.7% of exonerees convicted in states with a
compensation statute received compensation. Again, that number
will rise as pending claims are decided and premature claims are filed
and, later, decided. But, even if all premature claims were filed and all
of those and all pending claims were awarded for the claimant, the
maximum percentage of exonerees in states with statutes who could
receive state compensation would be 48%. If one looks at the nation
as a whole, rather than only states with compensation statutes, the
numbers drop. Only 46% of all exonerees filed state compensation
claims and only one-third received compensation. That decrease is
fairly small because, although 17 states lack a compensation statute,
those are states of conviction of only one-eighth of incarcerated
exonerees.
As noted, a compelling explanation for at least some nonfiling is that a significant number of exonerees served relatively little
time in prison. Of those 1,572 incarcerated, 177 served one year or
less. Given the relatively strict compensatory caps and absence of
attorney’s fees in most states, many who served comparatively little
time might not have filed because it was simply not affordable or
worth the effort.
The data, reflected in Figure 2, supports that hypothesis.
Generally, the longer the exoneree was imprisoned, the more likely
they were to file a state compensation claim. There is also evidence of
a correlation between length of wrongful incarceration and likelihood
of receipt of state compensation. Using the Registry’s “years lost”
data, it is possible to add the number of years of incarceration
experienced by those who received a state compensation award. The
177 Professor Encarnacion argues that, when the state incarcerates a person, it
employs that person’s body to deter others from committing crimes. As he
puts it, “the state in effect conscripts that person into criminal deterrence
services.” See Encarnacion, supra note 10, at 261. When the state does that
wrongly, Professor Encarnacion views the wages earned by a person employed
in an analogous occupation as being a reasonable metric for compensation.
He views a correctional officer as the closest analogy and observes that the
average hourly wage of such employees, multiplied by 24 hours/day, 365
days/year comes to about $180,000 per year. See id. at 268.
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results are telling. Although only 38.7% of exonerees in states with
statutes received compensation, they accounted for over 50% of the
years lost. [Columns O, T].
It is hardly a point of pride to conclude that almost half of all
time served in prison by exonerees convicted in states with statutes
was uncompensated, as was 55% of time served by all exonerees.
But it does show, in general, that exonerees who were unjustly
incarcerated for longer periods were relatively more likely to be
awarded compensation.
The experience in Texas illustrates both points. Texas has one
of the more generous compensation statutes in the country and the
most exonerees, but of 231 incarcerated Texans in our 2,000-person
database, 83 were wrongly incarcerated for one year or less. As
noted, most of those wrongful convictions arose from arrests for
possession of harmless substances. It is very likely that, because
of the volume of exonerees with short incarcerations, Texas has a
below-average filing rate of 43% and only 38% of Texas exonerees
received an award. But, of those who filed, nearly 88% received an
award and those awards covered nearly two-thirds of the years lost
by all Texas exonerees.
Previously, I observed that certain structural features of past
or existing state compensation statutes also depress filing rates
in certain states, such as those requiring a gubernatorial pardon,
those restricting eligibility only to those exonerated as a result of
DNA testing and those barring exonerees who had, before their
wrongful conviction been convicted of a felony.178 These unwarranted
restrictions invariably reduced the filing rates in Florida, Missouri,
Montana, Maryland, and Tennessee.179
Another possible explanation for non-filing could be the
modest compensation offered by some states. My previous article
examined at some length the caps on most state statutes and
demonstrated how these caps are far below per-year jury awards in
federal civil rights cases and judicial awards in states without caps.180
178 Gutman, supra note 11, at 395–96.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 397–408. Since the publication of my 2017 article, there have been three
jury verdicts for plaintiffs. In the Jacques Rivera case, a federal jury awarded
$17.175 million to a man wrongly imprisoned for 21.3 years. Sam Charles,
Jury Gives $17M To Man Falsely Imprisoned In Case Tied To Tainted Cop, Chi. SunTimes (June 29, 2018), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/jury-gives-17mto-man-falsely-imprisoned-for-murder-in-case-tied-to-tainted-cop/. In the
Jamal Trulove case, a San Francisco jury awarded $10 million to a wrongly
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A state legislative judgment assigning a value of a year of lost liberty
offers an objective basis for assessing comparative generosity. The
“grade sheet” in Chart 1 tries to do that. Uncapped statutes or those
that incorporate some measure of compensatory flexibility are, in
my view, more just that those with restrictive annual caps, overall
caps, or both. Using that compensatory metric alone,181 the following
grade sheet ranks the state statutes and notes the percentage of
incarcerated filers:

Chart 1 (State Statute Generosity)182
Grade

State

A

District of Columbia [50%], Maryland [22%], Minnesota
[54%], New York [77%], West Virginia [60%]

A-

Colorado [33%], Connecticut [83%], Texas [43%]

B+

Alabama [35%], Hawaii [50%]

B

Ohio [76%], New Jersey [53%]

B-

California [39%], Michigan [51%], Virginia [63%], Washington [40%]

C+

Florida [15%], Tennessee [17%], North Carolina [52%],
Utah [36%]

C

Massachusetts [70%], Mississippi [82%], Nebraska [78%]

C-

Maine [0%], Louisiana [71%]

D+

Iowa [29%], Oklahoma [24%]

D

Missouri [20%], Illinois [69%]

D-

New Hampshire [0%], Wisconsin [38%]

F

Montana [0%]

convicted man who was incarcerated for 5.1 years, or nearly $2 million per
year. Bob Egellko, S.F. Man Awarded $10 Million After Jury Finds Police Framed Him
For Murder, S.F. Chron., Apr. 6, 2018, at A1. A jury awarded $5 million each
for three Cleveland men each wrongly imprisoned for 19.2 years. Heisig, supra
note 8.
181 I exclude consideration of other compensatory mechanisms, such as social
and medical services, a waiver of income tax, award of attorney’s fee, and
refund of costs and penalties associated with the criminal conviction. Also
excluded was Vermont, with only one exoneree.
182 Massachusetts amended its statute in 2018 to raise its damages cap from
$500,000 to $1 million. Compare Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (West
2019) with Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (West 2017). Because the
database pre-dates that legislative change, Massachusetts’ “grade” reflects its
old statute, not the new one.
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One might expect some sort of correlation between filing rates
and generosity. To be sure, that correlation holds in some states. Filing
rates are relatively high in New York, West Virginia, and Connecticut
and low in Missouri and Montana. But, relative parsimony does not
appear to have much explanatory power as shown in the scatterplot
below. The filing rates in Illinois and Louisiana, for example, are well
above average and just below average in Wisconsin.183 Yet, those
states rank very low in comparative generosity. At the same time,
the filing rate is relatively low in several more (potentially) generous
states, such as Maryland, Minnesota, Alabama, Texas, New Jersey,
and Washington.

183 Wisconsin pays no more than $5,000 per year of wrongful incarceration, up
to a total maximum of $25,000. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 775.05(4) (West 2018).
Recent attempts to compensate Wisconsin exonerees up to $50,000 per year
with a maximum cap of $1,000,000 and to include social services appears
to lack support in the Wisconsin state senate. See Laurel White, Wrongful
Conviction Compensation Bill Likely Dead This Session, Wisconsin Public
Radio (Feb. 8, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.wpr.org/wrongful-convictioncompensation-bill-likely-dead-session (House sponsor declares bill dead in
February 2018); but see Brooke Hollingsworth, Bill looks to change compensation
law for wrongfully convicted individuals, The Badger Herald (Mar. 6,
2018),
https://badgerherald.com/news/2018/03/06/bill-looks-to-changecompensation-law-for-wrongfully-convicted-individuals/
(State
Senator
expresses optimism for passage of 2017 Senate Bill 456 introduced October
18, 2017).
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Figure 3 (State Compensation Filing by Generosity Grade)

Having now offered a somewhat impressionistic view of
what factors might affect state compensation filing rates, co-author
Lingxiao Sun ran a logistic regression model184 and computed the
184 Regression analysis is a statistical tool to determine the relationship between
variables. The factor or variable that we are studying or predicting is the
dependent variable. Here, those would be the likelihood of seeking and
receiving state and civil compensation. What factors impact that likelihood?
The factors which we hypothesize might impact the dependent variable are
called independent variables. The independent variables for which we have
data include whether, for example, the exoneree is male or female, of a
particular race or geographic area, and so on. If we were simply looking at the
relationship between two variables, like gender and LSAT score, a chi square
test between only two variables would be appropriate. If we were looking
at the effect of multiple variables jointly on the outcome, and the response
variable is a continuous variable (like amounts of money or years) a simple
linear model would be appropriate. Here, however, we are looking at the
effect of multiple prognostic variables jointly on the outcome – our dependent
variables. When there are multiple independent variables and the outcome is a
binary event, like filing/no filing or receiving/not receiving, logistic regression
is the appropriate analysis to perform.
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marginal effects of each explanatory or prognostic variable-the
“Bio Codes,” the Tags,” the “Worst Crime,” the “Contributing
Factors,” and the “Geo Factors”-on the probability of filing for state
compensation and the probability of prevailing on filed claims. Here,
we do not presume to attribute causation between the independent
variables and the dependent variable in each model. Instead, we use
this approach as a convenient way to summarize association between
the variables while holding other independent variables constant.
Prior to presenting the results of the logistic models, Table 4 sets
forth the basic percentages-the first column being the percentages
of those with the listed characteristic seeking state compensation and
the second being the percentages of those with each characteristic
receiving state compensation:
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Table 4 (Percentage of Exonerees with Each
Characteristic Filing for State Compensation and
Receiving State Compensation)
185, 186

Characteristic

State Compensation Filed

P Value

State Compensation Received

P Value

CIU

89/158=56.33%

0.3316

75/81=92.59%

0.004

No CIU

739/1414=52.26%

GP

106/290=36.55%

No GP

722/1282=56.32%

526/656=80.18%

IOA

249/345=72.17%

<.0001 212/229=92.58% <.0001

534/674=79.23%
<.0001

83/99=83.84%

0.3907

No IOA

579/1227=47.19%

397/526=75.48%

DNA Ex.

251/303=82.84%

<.0001 233/242=96.28% <.0001

No DNA
Ex.

577/1269=45.47%

376/513=73.29%

DP

47/96=48.96%

No D.P.

781/1476=52.91%

FC

133/211=63.03%

No FC

695/1361=51.07%

506/631=80.19%

MWID

354/527=67.17%

<.0001 282/329=85.71%

No MWID

474/1045=45.36%

327/426=76.76%

F/MF

206/386=53.37%

0.452

34/45=75.56%

0.3711

575/710=80.99%
0.0012

0.7525

103/124=83.06%

158/186=84.95%

0.4588
0.002
0.0884

185 As noted below, the simple percentages show wide variations in some of the
characteristics. That gives a hint, but not a statistical showing, of an association
between the likelihood of filing for or receiving state compensation and the
characteristic. The p value of a chi square test between only two variables
(like gender and likelihood of filing) provides that showing. As explained
below, we start with a hypothesis that there is no association between
the characteristic and likelihood of filing. The p value is the probability of
observing a random association in the data. In general, a p value less than
0.05 is considered unlikely and data thus provides evidence supporting the
alternative hypothesis-that the factor under study is indeed associated with
the outcome, that is, increasing or decreasing the chance of the outcome
event. The p value in Tables 5, 6, 8 and 9 is the result of a different statistical
analysis-one that accounts for all factors examined rather than simply the
one in Tables 4 and 7.
186 In this Table and Table 7, note that the numerator of the fraction in column
1-claims filed-is not the same as the denominator of the fraction in column
3-claims decided. That is because the latter denominator excludes pending
cases.
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State Compensation Filed

No F/MF

622/1186=52.45%

P Value

State Compensation Received
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P Value

451/569=79.26%

P/FA.

460/898=51.22%

No P/FA

368/674=54.60%

0.1848

335/423=79.20%

0.2496

OM

405/773=52.39%

No OM

423/799=52.94%

Male

786/1456=53.98%

Female

42/116=36.21%

29/40=72.50%

Murder

372/674=55.19%

<.0001 281/336=83.63% <.0001

Sexual
Assault

175/255=68.63%

150/165=90.91%

Drugs

24/123=19.51%

14/22=63.64%

Child Sexual Abuse

93/201=46.27%

64/85=75.29%

Robbery

52/93=55.91%

37/50=74.00%

Other
Crime

112/226=49.56%

63/97=64.95%

Black

476/805=59.13%

<.0001 376/438=85.84% <.0001

Caucasian

247/561=44.03%

153/220=69.55%

Hispanic

93/182=51.10%

73/88=82.95%

Other

12/24=50.00%

7/9=77.78%

South

253/582=43.47%

<.0001 213/246=86.59% <.0001

West

90/239=37.66%

48/79=60.76%

Northeast

238/322=73.91%

162/212=76.42%

Midwest

247/429=57.58%

186/218=85.32%

Red State
(2016)

329/752=43.75%

<.0001 249/298=83.56%

Blue State
(2016)

499/820=60.85%

360/457=78.77%

274/332=82.53%
0.8278

302/378=79.89%

0.5926

307/377=81.43%
0.0002

580/715=81.12%

0.1792

0.1039

The simple percentages and associated p values support
some findings that are not terribly surprising: the percentages of
state compensation filing by exonerees who did not plead guilty,187
187 Seven states-California, Colorado, District of Columbia, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Virginia-entirely or partly bar compensation to those who
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who were exonerated by DNA evidence, and who were supported in
their exoneration efforts by an innocence organization were much
higher than those with the opposite characteristics. Predictably, the
filing rate of those wrongly convicted of drug crimes was quite low;
that can be explained by the generally much lower sentences for
such crimes and thus fewer years lost.
Other results were less expected. The percentage of filers
whose wrongful conviction was at least partly attributable to a false
confession or mistaken witness identification was much higher
than for those who did not falsely confess or did not have mistaken
witness ID issues in their criminal cases. African-Americans had
much higher filing rates than whites. Filing rates in states with
compensation statutes were highest in the Northeast, twice as high
as in the West. And filing rates were higher in blue states with
statutes than red states with statutes.
With respect to results of state compensation claims, because
state statutes are no-fault statutes, one would not expect particular
characteristics to be associated with a higher likelihood of success
except for exoneration by DNA, which is virtually unassailable proof
of factual innocence. Not surprisingly, then, DNA exonerees were
much more likely to prevail than non-DNA exonerees (96% prevailed
compared to 73%). This may account for the high percentage of
prevailing in sexual assault cases. As might be expected, a greater
percentage of those assisted in their exoneration by an innocence
organization prevailed than those who were not.
Interestingly, African-Americans and Hispanics had much
higher rates of prevailing on state compensation claims-about 86%
and 83%, respectively-than whites. Those in the South, which had a
relatively low rate of filing, had the highest rate of success regionally.
Although filing rates were lower in red states, exonerees in those
states prevailed at a greater rate than those wrongly convicted
claimants in blue states.
The percentages, while interesting, have an obvious limitation.
They cannot offer insight into the extent to which characteristics
other than the ones examined contribute to the results found. We
plead guilty to a crime that they did not commit. California is an example of
a partial bar-prohibiting compensation to those who plead guilty to protect
another. Cal. Penal Code § 4903(c) (West 2019). Ohio, in contrast, has
an outright bar. Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.48(A)(2) (West 2019). But these
states seem unlikely alone to account for the wide variance in filing between
those who pled guilty and those who did not.
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cannot assume, for example, that gender alone is responsible for the
differences between males and females. Other factors might partially
drive the results observed. For example, virtually no females are
exonerated as a result of DNA analysis; thus, the lower percentages
of females filing for state compensation may partially be the result
of that factor.
A regression model permits us to determine whether particular
characteristics are associated in a statistically significant way with
the likelihood of filing for or receiving state or civil compensation
while accounting for the effects of the other characteristics in the
model. We have four tables summarizing the results. Tables 5 and 6
deal with filing for and receiving state compensation (respectively).
Tables 8 and 9 cover the filing for and receiving of civil compensation
(respectively).

Table 5 (Logistic Regression Analyzing State Filing for
Compensation)
95% Confidence
Interval

Characteristic

P Value

Odds Ratio

CIU

0.0201

1.765

1.093

2.848

GP

0.0889

0.739

0.521

1.047

IOA

0.0059

1.559

1.137

2.139

DP

0.9283

1.023

0.619

1.691

DNA Ex.

<.0001

4.28

2.811

6.517

FC

0.4237

1.168

0.798

1.71

MWID

0.0746

1.347

0.971

1.87

F/MF

0.513

1.106

0.818

1.495

P/FA

0.7715

1.047

0.77

1.422

OM

0.0271

0.74

0.567

0.967

Sexual Assault

0.3126

0.902

0.593

1.37

Drugs

0.0118

0.571

0.307

1.063

Child Sexual
Abuse

0.4103

1.23

0.833

1.815

Robbery

0.1254

1.499

0.878

2.557

Other Crimes

0.0039

1.639

1.128

2.382

Asian

0.5411

1.31

0.341

5.031

Caucasian

0.3762

0.721

0.551

0.943
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95% Confidence
Interval

Characteristic

P Value

Odds Ratio

Hispanic

0.9423

0.887

0.607

1.297

Native
American

0.3026

1.989

0.345

3.486

Other

0.196

0.33

0.055

1.98

Female

0.8555

1.044

0.659

1.652

Midwest

0.0519

1.654

1.216

2.25

Northeast

<.0001

2.89

1.876

4.451

West

<.0001

0.678

0.437

1.052

Blue State (2016)

0.0024

1.664

1.197

2.313

Years Lost

<.0001

1.056

1.037

1.076

How do we read Tables 5, 6, 8, and 9? Let’s look at the
DNA exoneration line in Table 5. The logistic regression model
asks and answers the following question: compared to those whose
exoneration did not result from DNA analysis, were those exonerated
by DNA more likely to file for state statutory compensation, while
holding all other characteristics fixed? Where there are binary
parameters-such as conviction integrity unit involvement or not,
or official misconduct or not-the characteristic listed is presented
relative to its opposite. Where there are multiple parameters, like
race, crime, and region, the characteristic listed is compared to
the one that is left out. For example, each of the worst crimes are
compared to murder, the races are compared to African-Americans
and the regions are compared to the South.
We start with a null hypothesis: that there is no statistical
association between the characteristic, like exoneration by DNA,
the variable we are testing, and the likelihood of an exoneree filing
for state statutory compensation. The null hypothesis is that the
characteristic and variable tested are entirely independent of each
other. In Table 4, we saw a pretty large difference between DNA
and non-DNA exonerees and the percentage of filings for state
compensation, so we may not believe our null hypothesis. On the
other hand, perhaps a good part of that percentage difference is
better explained by some other variable, like the fact that only males
are DNA exonerees.
Using a chi-square test, we can test the validity of that null
hypothesis. The test compares the observed data against the null
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hypothesis. We consider characteristics with a p value of less than
or equal to .05 to be statistically significant, and we shade those in
the tables. In these cases, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude
that there is a correlation between the characteristic and the variable
examined. That association is positive when the odds ratio is greater
than one and negative when it is less than one. Not surprisingly,
DNA exoneration reveals a very low p value, indicating a strong
association between being a DNA exoneree and filing for state
compensation, all other factors held constant. And, that association
is positive-the odds ratio is greater than one.
We can also see a positive association between exoneration
through the intervention of a conviction integrity unit and assistance
of an innocence organization, so-called professional exonerators,
and filing for state compensation. As predicted, there is a negative
correlation between filing and wrongful conviction for drug crimes
compared to murder. Compared to the South, there is a positive
correlation with filing and wrongful conviction in states with a
statute in the Northeast and a negative correlation in the West. There
is a positive association between likelihood of filing and a wrongful
conviction in a blue state with a compensation statute compared to
a red state. There is also an association between years lost and filing.
For every additional year of incarceration, the odds of filing increase
by almost 6%.
Equally as important are the characteristics shown to have no
association with the likelihood of filing. Table 5 shows no association
between gender and race and the likelihood of state filing. Thus, the
percentage differences seen in Table 4 with respect to the likelihood
of filing and gender and race are better attributed to other factors.
Table 5 shows no association between any of the “Contributing
Factors” and the likelihood of filing for state compensation.
What can we say about the strength of the statistically
significant association between a characteristic and an examined
variable? That’s where the odds ratio comes in. Returning to Table
5 and DNA exoneration, we see an odds ratio of over four. That
means that the odds of a DNA exoneree filing for compensation are
four times that of a non-DNA exoneree.188 We can say that there is
188 Perhaps an example would help. Odds are the probability of success divided
by the probability of failure (or, here, the probability of filing/not filing or
receiving/not receiving). Assume non-DNA exonerees have a probability
of filing of .5 and a probability of non-filing of .5. Assume further that the
probability of DNA exonerees filing is .8 and the non-filing probability is 0.2.
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a strong association between DNA exoneration and filing for state
compensation, compared to those who are not DNA exonerees.189
The following table summarizes the results of a similar
regression analysis for the receipt of state compensation. What
characteristics are associated with higher likelihoods of receiving
state compensation?

Table 6 (Logistic Regression Analyzing State Receipt of
Compensation)
95% Confidence
Interval

Characteristic

P Value

Odds Ratio

CIU

0.0469

2.549

1.013

6.415

GP

0.0326

2.161

1.066

4.379

IOA

0.0013

2.791

1.494

5.214

DP

0.0989

0.484

0.204

1.146

DNA Ex.

<.0001

6.773

2.885

15.904

FC

0.1257

0.591

0.301

1.159

MWID

0.6859

1.125

0.636

1.991

F/MF

0.6109

0.866

0.499

1.505

P/FA

0.9521

1.017

0.581

1.781

OM

0.9503

0.985

0.603

1.607

Sexual Assault

0.9909

0.639

0.292

1.399

Drugs

0.2464

0.377

0.124

1.153

Child Sexual
Abuse

0.7638

0.693

0.342

1.407

Robbery

0.7144

0.722

0.305

1.705

In that case, the odds ratio is 4: .8/.2 ÷ .5/.5. The most accurate way of
describing the result is that DNA exonerees are much more likely to file than
non-DNA exonerees, while accounting for the effect of all other characteristics
in the model. It is less accurate to say that DNA exonerees are four times
more likely to file than non-DNA exonerees.
189 Notice, too, that the tables include a 95% confidence interval. A 95%
confidence interval means if we take many similar samples from the given
population, 95% of the computed confidence intervals would contain the true
odds ratio. Put a little more simply, but not quite as accurately, we have 95%
confidence, with respect to DNA exonerees, that the true odds ratio is in the
interval of 2.811 to 6.517.
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95% Confidence
Interval

Characteristic

P Value

Odds Ratio

Other Crimes

0.5555

0.551

0.293

1.036

Asian

0.9655

1.012

0.096

1.928

Caucasian

0.9503

0.504

0.318

0.798

Hispanic

0.9688

1.174

0.592

2.326

Native
American

0.9585

0.733

0.062

1.404

Other

0.9617

>999.999

<0.001

>999.999

Female

0.8654

1.074

0.469

2.462

Midwest

0.6041

0.936

0.497

1.763

Northeast

0.3429

0.451

0.203

1.005

West

0.0003

0.22

0.091

0.534

Blue State (2016)

0.269

1.469

0.743

2.903

Years Lost

0.1792

1.024

0.989

1.059

This analysis shows that involvement of a conviction integrity
unit, assistance of an innocence organization, and DNA exoneration
were positively associated with receiving state compensation. So was
a guilty plea for reasons that are difficult to discern. DNA showed the
strongest association-the odds of prevailing in a state compensation
claim were almost seven times higher for DNA exonerees than
non-DNA exonerees. The “worst crime” and “Contributing Factor”
characteristics are not associated with higher or lower likelihoods of
prevailing. Nor is gender, race, blue/red state, or years lost associated
with a greater or lesser likelihood of receiving compensation. With
respect to geography, the odds of receiving state compensation in the
West are about one-quarter of the odds of receiving compensation
in the South.
Having examined the statistical relationships between
various characteristics and the likelihood of seeking and receiving
state compensation, let’s return to the data in Spreadsheet 1 and
its state-by-state comparison of percentages of filings and awards.
Understanding that premature and pending claims may change these
numbers in the future, a scan through Columns H (the percentage
of incarcerated non-filers), Column J (the percentage of incarcerated
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filers), Column L (the percentage of filed claims awarded), Column
O (the percentage of incarcerated exonerees compensated), and
Column T (the percentage of lost time compensated) reveals
considerable variation among the states. Obviously, the higher the
percentages, the better.
Putting aside the generosity of the statutes, these percentages
offer another way to evaluate fairness: to look not only at the
percentages of exonerees filing and receiving awards (as I had in my
prior article), but also the percentages of years lost compensated.
For example, take State A with ten exonerees. Assume that nine
exonerees file for compensation and eight receive awards. That state
looks very good. Ninety percent file, 89% of filers are compensated,
and 80% of all exonerees receive awards.
How would we feel, though, about State A if each of the
eight exonerees awarded compensation served only one year in
prison as a result of a wrongful conviction and the two who were not
compensated (say one did not apply and one was denied) each spent
twenty years in prison? We might feel less positively about State A,
which seems to do an excellent job compensating those who might
be regarded as less harmed and a terrible job compensating those
incarcerated far longer. Indeed, we might feel much better about
State A if only the two long-serving exonerees sought compensation
and received it, and the eight serving only one year did not even
apply.
In this sense, states with compensation statutes, however
they are graded on my generosity chart, should strive to have what
I will call “breadth of coverage”: (1) high percentages of exonerees
who file for state compensation, (2) high percentages of awarded
claims, (3) high percentages of exonerees with awards,190 and (4)
high percentages of lost years compensated.191 The presence of these
characteristics would suggest a statute that is sufficiently generous
to incentivize filing, a statute with low barriers to compensation, an
implementation of the statute that favors awards and a system that
makes awards to long-serving exonerees. To evaluate comparative
“breadth of coverage,” I analyzed the corresponding Columns J,
L, O, and T in Spreadsheet 1 and excluded four states with three
190 This third characteristic is not independent of 1 and 2, but a function of them.
191 The “breadth of coverage” analysis excludes two very important features of
a just state compensation program-the speed at which claims are decided
following post-conviction relief and the speed by which successful claims are
paid.
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exonerees or fewer.192
To be sure, this is an imperfect comparative exercise. First,
to rank order the states, I weighted each of the four factors equally.
One could reorder the rankings by reweighting the factors. Second,
states with relatively high numbers of exonerees not filing due to
short terms of wrongful imprisonment (such as Texas), relatively
high numbers of premature claims (such as Texas and Wisconsin),
and relatively high numbers of pending claims (such as Michigan
and New York) are disadvantaged. A more definitive analysis would
wait for the statute of limitations to run and for all claims to be
decided. Yet, the number of exonerees with definitive results (either
not filing or filing claims that have been decided) is large enough to
draw some lessons.
One of them is that of the twenty-nine states examined, only
six states were above the national average with respect to each of
these four characteristics: Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nebraska, and Virginia. Only two of these states (Minnesota and
Virginia) got a grade as high as a B- in generosity, with the remainder
earning a C or less. Ironically, the states with the best “breadth of
coverage” are among the least generous.
Chart 2 is a grade sheet reflecting comparative “breadth of
coverage” when weighing each characteristic equally. Two states tied
for first: Mississippi and Nebraska. For reasons that are not easy to
explain, Mississippi and Nebraska share very high rates of filing,
rates of award, and lost years compensated. They, of course, both
benefit from having comparatively few exonerees, but so do many
other states with less breadth of coverage. Nebraska, in particular,
may benefit in this analysis by an odd quirk: of its nine exonerees,
six (the “Beatrice 6”) were wrongly convicted together of the same
crime. It is reasonable to expect that, in multi-exoneree cases of this
sort, each file (if any of them do) and that the results are the same.

192 Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont.
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Chart 2 (Breadth of State Statutory Compensation
Coverage)
Grade
A+
A
AB+
B
BC+
C
CD+
D
DF

State
Mississippi, Nebraska
Illinois, Louisiana, Connecticut
Virginia, New York
Massachusetts, Ohio, West Virginia, Utah, Minnesota,
Texas, North Carolina
New Jersey, Oklahoma
Wisconsin
Tennessee, District of Columbia, Missouri
Washington, Florida
California
Alabama, Colorado, Maryland
Michigan
Iowa
Montana

As someone who has done a fair amount of grading, I can say
with confidence that creating this grading curve was not difficult.
This is not a narrow bell curve; the spread among states is wide,
substantial, and troubling. Of course, in seventeen states, there is no
statute at all, but for the rest, the reality is that the chances of seeking
and receiving state statutory compensation turn substantially on
fortuity-one’s state of wrongful conviction.
As discussed, some of it can be explained by unnecessary
disqualifying statutory provisions, interpretations of those provisions
that disadvantage claimants and extreme ungenerosity. Some of
it may be due simply to numbers-perhaps it is unreasonable to
expect states with large numbers of exonerees to have high filing,
receipt, and years lost coverage rates simply due to size, although
Illinois does. States with smaller numbers of exonerees and multiple
co-defendant cases (like Nebraska) may post better percentage
numbers due to their smaller size.
Whether the state statute requires the claimant to file in
a trial court, a court of claims, directly with the legislature or an
administrative entity seems not to have any explanatory power. Nor
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does the date of the enactment of the statute offer a compelling
explanation for the breadth of coverage outcome. Ultimately, some
of the variations may be due to intangible custom and local culture.
States with strong innocence programs, experienced and skilled
attorneys in this area of practice, and a widespread public recognition
and understanding of accessible state compensation programs may
perform comparatively better.
The data show another concerning aspect of inter-state
variation. Column Q of Spreadsheet 1 shows the average annual
amount of compensation provided per state to prevailing claimants.
Because most state statutes contain annual or overall caps or both,
one might expect some narrowing in the variation among the states.
But, that is not reflected in Column Q. The average annual award,
for example, in Wisconsin is just over $3,000 per year of wrongful
imprisonment while it is over $375,000 per year in the District of
Columbia.
The reason is obvious: D.C. had and partially still has an
uncapped statute, while Wisconsin imposes a $5,000 per year cap, up
to $25,000. But, the point is that there is no conceivable justification
for a system in which the value of a lost year of liberty is 119 times
greater in one state than another. Fair-minded people can debate
whether breadth of coverage or generosity, or some combination of
the two, better reflect shared principles of fairness in an environment
of finite resources. Yet even if that debate is resolved differently
in different states, it is essential to dramatically narrow the wide
variations in average annual compensation reflected in Column Q.
Of course, that is easy to say and impossible to do, at least
systematically since, of course, each state sets its compensatory
parameters and process. But, it does offer an additional argument
for advocates supporting new state laws in states without them and
reforms to existing statutes. When considering whether alternative
legislative proposals are fair and just, states should consider
the degree to which the competing options treat exonerees fairly
compared to other states. Kansas’ 2018 statute does so. House Bill
4838, introduced in February 2018 in the South Carolina House of
Representatives, which would have awarded up to $15,000 per year
of wrongful imprisonment with a cap of $50,000, did not.193
193 H. 4838, 2018 Gen. Assemb., 122d Sess. (S.C. 2018), § 24-13-2340(B)(1),
https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess122_2017-2018/bills/4838.htm. See also
Chelsea Evans, Constitutional Law: A Dime for Your Time: A Case for Compensating
the Wrongfully Convicted in South Carolina, 68 S.C. L. Rev. 539, 566 (2017)
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B. Federal Civil Rights and Tort Litigation
As explained, eight states, most notably Texas, bar exonerees
from seeking damages arising from wrongful conviction if the
lawsuits were awarded state statutory compensation. For those not
precluded, exonerees may file a federal civil rights suit and/or state
tort suit in addition to or instead of state compensation. Earlier, I
briefly reviewed the bases of some claims of this sort and the typical
defenses to them. Because the plaintiff must prove unconstitutional
misconduct or tortious negligence, often decades after the events,
no one would suggest that these are simple cases. To the contrary,
the difficulty and potential expense of such cases is a reason many
give for expanding and strengthening no-fault state compensation
statutes.194
Our study of state statutory compensation required us to
look at a subset of our 2,000-person database-those wrongfully
convicted in states with compensation statutes-and added a layer
of complexity because these statutes were adopted over time. Civil
rights and torts litigation involves no similar wrinkles-they can
be filed by any person listed in the Registry not precluded from
doing so under state law. Even so, the difficulty of these cases, their
expense, and the need to demonstrate unconstitutional misconduct
or negligence supports a hypothesis that filing and prevailing rates
should be modest.195 The empirical reality is more complicated. Let’s
review the nationwide numbers, which are also broken down by
state in Spreadsheet 2.
1. Filing of Claims
Of the 2,000 exonerees, 198 served no prison time. [Columns
B and C]. To keep Spreadsheet 2 manageable, the remaining columns
deal only with the remaining 1,802 incarcerated exonerees. Of those,
808, or 45%, filed civil compensation claims. [Columns H, I].196 This
number is likely to rise because 74 exonerees have “premature”
claims that may yet be filed. [Column F].
Column G shows the numbers of cases filed in each state.
(advocating for a state compensation statute in South Carolina).
194 See Gutman, supra note 11, at 372 n.11 (citing articles making this point).
195 Prevailing means that the civil compensation suit resulted in some recovery
for the plaintiff. In the substantial majority of such cases, compensation was
paid following a settlement rather than following trial.
196 Of the 1,802 incarcerated exonerees, approximately 138 were barred from
filing such lawsuits because they had accepted state compensation. Excluding
this group, the effective filing rate was, perhaps surprisingly, almost 50%.
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The largest number of cases were filed by those wrongly convicted
in Illinois (146), followed by New York (136). Column H indicates
the percentage of incarcerated filers in each state. Excluding states
with four or fewer exonerees, the data show a substantial variation
among the states. The proportion of exonerated filers is highest in
Illinois (over 80%). Part of that might be explained by a relatively
ungenerous state statute and a concentration of civil rights attorneys
with expertise in these cases centered in the Chicago area.
In contrast, excluding the small states and states that bar
civil compensation suits following receipt of state statutory awards,
the proportion of exonerated filers for civil compensation was
less than 20% in Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New
Mexico, Virginia and Wisconsin. One might expect the likelihood of
civil rights and torts litigation to be higher in states without state
compensation statutes or with particularly ungenerous ones. That
turns out not be the case. Georgia, for example, is the state with the
second largest number of exonerees without a statute and, yet, a low
civil compensation filing rate.197 Wisconsin has a particularly poor
state statute and a low civil compensation filing rate, although it also
has an unusually long statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims
and some claims may yet be filed.
As with state statutory compensation, we tested whether
there was a relationship between the likelihood of filing civil
compensation and the year of exoneration and amount of time lost.
We found, as shown in Figure 4, that there is no growth in seeking
civil compensation over time. That finding is at odds with our
intuition that increasing percentages of these cases are filed over time
as large settlements and verdicts are publicized and more attorneys
develop expertise in litigating these cases. That conclusion, though,
should be tempered by the reality that the statute of limitations,
which differs from state to state, has not yet run for relatively recent
exonerees.
As we found with state statutory compensation, there is an
obvious association between seeking civil compensation seeking and
years lost. Figure 5 accords with one’s intuition that the likelihood
of filing rises with the length of the unjust incarceration.

197 However, the state with the most exonerees but without a state compensation
statute, Pennsylvania, has a civil compensation filing rate of over 50%.
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Figure 4 (Civil Compensation Claims by Year of Extension)
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Figure 5 (Civil Compensation Claims by Years Lost)

Table 7 sets forth the percentages of civil compensation
filings and recoveries by each characteristic examined.198

Table 7 (Percentage of Exonerees with Each
Characteristic Filing for and Receiving Civil
Compensation)
Characteristic

Civil Case
Compensation
Filed

P Value

Civil Case
Compensation
Received

P Value

CIU

66/240=27.50%

<.0001

31/42=73.81%

0.3204

No CIU

779/1760=44.26%

GP

112/424=26.42%

No GP

733/1576=46.51%

392/603=65.01%

IOA

253/400=63.25%

<.0001 137/180=76.11%

434/654=66.36%
<.0001

73/93=78.49%

0.0101
0.0021

198 The totals of the denominators in the “civil case compensation received”
column within each characteristic do not add up to the numerators in the
“civil compensation case filed” column because the former excludes pending
cases.
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Characteristic

Civil Case
Compensation
Filed

No IOA

592/1600=37.00%

328/516=63.57%

DNA Ex.

194/346=56.07%

<.0001 139/177=78.53%

No DNA
Ex.

651/1654=39.36%

326/519=74.57%

P Value

DP

66/117=56.41%

No DP

779/1883=41.37%

431/640=67.34%

FC

164/248=66.13%

<.0001 103/130=79.23%

No FC

681/1752=38.87%

362/566=63.96%

MWID

276/611=45.17%

No MWID

569/1389=40.96%

F/MF

207/493=41.99%

No F/MF

638/1507=42.34%

P/FA
No P/FA

0.0014

Civil Case
Compensation
Received

0.0793

34/56=60.71%

147/230=63.91%

P Value

0.0001

0.3124
0.0009
0.2541

318/466=68.24%
0.892

117/178=65.73%

0.7228

348/518=67.18%

585/1109=52.75% <.0001 335/480=69.79%
260/891=29.18%

130/216=60.19%

OM

574/931=61.65%

<.0001 326/462=70.56%

No OM

271/1069=25.35%

139/234=59.40%

Male

786/1814=43.33%

Female

59/186=31.72%

Murder

476/799=59.57%

<.0001 268/381=70.34%

Sexual
Assault

118/301=39.20%

68/101=67.33%

Drugs

31/218=14.22%

14/22=63.64%

Child Sexual Abuse

75/240=31.25%

42/70=60.00%

Robbery

30/105=28.57%

12/25=48.00%

Other
Crime

115/337=34.12%

61/97=62.89%

0.0023

436/646=67.49%

0.0128
0.0031
0.1697

29/50=58.00%

Black

446/952=46.85%

Caucasian

286/771=37.09%

0.0003

151/242=62.40%

Hispanic

102/240=42.50%

59/88=67.05%

Other

11/37=29.73%

6/7=85.71%

South

182/744=24.46%

<.0001

249/359=69.36%

83/152=54.61%

0.1364

0.23

<.0001
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Characteristic

Civil Case
Compensation
Filed

West

151/330=45.76%

80/132=60.61%

Northeast

226/413=54.72%

149/188=79.26%

Midwest

282/506=55.73%

151/220=68.64

Red State
(2016)

332/1071=31.00% <.0001 151/270=55.93% <.0001

Blue State
(2016)

509/922=55.21%

P Value

Civil Case
Compensation
Received

769

P Value

312/422=73.93%

Let’s look first at the rates of filing and the associated p
values in Columns 1 and 2. Those whose exonerations resulted
from the intervention of a conviction integrity unit were much less
likely to file for civil compensation than those not so assisted. One
would suspect that participation of a CIU and the imprimatur of that
assistance would make those helped more likely to file. As previously
noted, however, a large number of these cases are the drug cases
from Harris County, Texas. So far, only one of those exonerees has
filed a civil rights claim (unsuccessfully), presumably because the
lengths of their incarcerations were very short. That undoubtedly
led to the rather low rate of CIU filers.
Those who falsely confessed, were sentenced to death, or
who were wrongly convicted based at least in part on perjured or
false testimony were much more likely to file than those who did
not. Those who pled guilty were much less likely to file than those
who did not, perhaps because of a view that a guilty plea undermines
a civil rights case. African-American and Hispanic exonerees were
more likely to seek civil compensation than white exonerees. Females
filed at a lower rate than men. Those who were wrongly convicted of
murder filed more frequently than those wrongly convicted of other
crimes; drugs were the least frequent.
Not surprisingly, those whose exonerations were aided
by an innocence organization were much more likely to file civil
compensation cases than those who were not. As one might expect,
DNA exonerees were more likely to file than those exonerated for
other reasons. Given the requirement that misconduct be found to
prevail in civil rights and torts cases, one would expect that those
wrongly convicted at least in part because of government misconduct
would be more likely to file than those who were not. The data shows

770

Gutman and Sun

that to be true. Geographically, filing rates were much lower in the
South than in other regions of the country and much lower in red
states than blue states.
Again, the usual caution is in order. Simple percentage
comparisons do not mean that the differences can be attributed
only to that characteristic. Other characteristics examined (or not
examined) may explain some of those differences. Thus, as we
did with state statutory compensation, a logistic regression was
run to determine which characteristics were associated with the
likelihood of filing for civil compensation, all other characteristics
held constant. Again, those with p values less than .05 showed an
association. Table 8 sets forth the results:

Table 8 (Logistic Regression Analyzing Civil
Compensation Filing)
95% Confidence
Interval

Characteristic

P Value

Odds Ratio

CIU

0.3487

0.803

0.508

1.271

GP

0.7465

0.946

0.678

1.321

IOA

0.0011

1.641

1.218

2.211

DP

0.6866

1.105

0.68

1.795

DNA Ex.

<.0001

2.102

1.446

3.055

FC

0.0105

1.601

1.116

2.296

MWID

0.066

1.347

0.981

1.85

F/MF

0.0131

1.419

1.076

1.872

P/FA

<.0001

1.791

1.349

2.377

OM

<.0001

3.153

2.477

4.013

Sexual Assault

0.0834

0.517

0.354

0.755

Drugs

0.7222

0.739

0.424

1.289

Child Sexual
Abuse

0.0496

0.504

0.348

0.729

Robbery

0.7103

0.63

0.373

1.064

Other Crimes

0.1452

0.827

0.59

1.16

Asian

0.704

0.784

0.22

2.793

Caucasian

0.3474

0.803

0.622

1.035

Hispanic

0.1342

0.956

0.668

1.368
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95% Confidence
Interval

Characteristic

P Value

Odds Ratio

Native
American

0.54

0.428

0.105

1.747

Other

0.3093

0.242

0.027

2.16

Female

0.801

0.95

0.635

1.419

Midwest

<.0001

3.478

2.569

4.709

Northeast

0.0373

2.792

1.948

4.002

West

0.2365

2.567

1.749

3.767

Blue State (2016)

0.0001

1.726

1.31

2.276

Years Lost

<.0001

1.06

1.042

1.078

Is there a statistical association between the characteristics
and the likelihood of filing a civil compensation case? Here again,
interestingly, there is no statistical correlation between race or gender
and the likelihood of filing. Nor was there a correlation between any
of the worst crimes for which the exoneree was wrongly convicted
and the likelihood of filing, except for child sex abuse. Those wrongly
convicted of that crime were substantially less likely to file a suit for
civil compensation.
As with state statutory compensation, the participation of an
innocence organization and DNA exoneration were again positively
associated with the likelihood of filing a civil compensation suit. The
odds of filing a civil compensation case were over twice that in DNA
exoneration cases than other cases. The involvement of a conviction
integrity unit was not associated with the likelihood of filing a civil
case.
With respect to the “Contributing Factors,” the existence of
a false confession, perjury or false allegations, false or misleading
forensic evidence, and official misconduct were factors associated
with an increased likelihood of filing. The strongest association was
to be expected-those exonerees who were wrongly convicted at
least in part as a result of official misconduct. The odds of filing
were over three times greater with official misconduct than without.
Assuming that the Registry accurately codes cases with official
misconduct, this suggests that civil rights lawyers may do a pretty
good job in case selection.
Exonerees wrongly convicted in the Midwest and Northeast
were much more likely to file for civil compensation than those in
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the South. There was a positive association between being convicted
in a blue state and filing for civil compensation. The odds of filing in
blue states were 1.7 times greater than in red states. And, for every
year lost, the odds of filing for civil compensation increased by 6%.
2. Results of Filing
Let’s turn next to the results of civil compensation litigation.
Much of the literature repeats the narrative that litigating federal civil
compensation or state tort cases is difficult, time-consuming and
expensive. While true, difficult is not synonymous with unsuccessful.
Surprising to us was the finding that, of the 808 cases filed by
incarcerated exonerees, 55%, or 448 cases, resulted in a plaintiff ’s
verdict or settlement. [Columns I, J]. That number is likely to rise
because there remain 143 pending lawsuits. [Column L]. Recall, by
comparison, that the rate of prevailing in state compensation cases
is 73.5%.
That reasonably high rate of prevailing does not mean, of
course, that they were all multi-million dollar verdicts. Eighty-nine
verdicts were less than $500,000. The average award for prevailing
formerly incarcerated plaintiffs was over $3.8 million. A high rate
of prevailing and recovery of high awards is, again, arguably an
indication that skilled attorneys quite accurately screen cases with
significant monetary value. Of the cases filed, 217, or 27%, were
dismissed or resulted in no recovery for the plaintiff. [Column M].
Wrongful conviction imposes enormous costs on society,
not the least of which is the harm to the wrongly convicted and their
families and continued opportunities for the real culprits to commit
crimes. The total amount awarded to prevailing plaintiffs was over
$1.7 billion at the time of this writing. [Column N].199 This sum
should be considered in proper context. It reflects a nationwide total
spanning nearly thirty years.
In that connection, geographic variation is enormously
significant. Over 53% of all civil compensation was awarded to
formerly incarcerated exonerees in just two states-Illinois and
New York-which together accounted for only 22% of the 1,802
199 I was unable to find settlement figures in 22 cases. [Column O]. I coded
those cases as ones in which the plaintiffs prevailed, but could not record the
amount. That will depress the total amount awarded somewhat. However,
the total number of years lost associated with these 22 cases was 117.2 years.
Many of these cases involved relatively short terms of wrongful imprisonment
and, likely, fairly modest settlements.
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exonerees in the database. Although a number of exonerations in
those states resulted from the discovery of patterns of repeated
misconduct by a small number of police officers,200 it is unlikely that
this alone accounts for this finding. The nature of the jury pools
(or perceived jury pools) in metropolitan Chicago and New York,
negotiations that account for the history of prior settlements, and
the substantial experience and expertise of specialized law firms
practicing in those areas are undoubtedly contributing factors to
explain the compensatory dominance of these two states.
The national average recovery per year of incarceration is
almost $305,000. [Column R]. The volume of awards in Illinois and
New York, which both compensate at higher than the national average
($426,741 and $341,200, respectively) raise the national average.
There are some states with yet higher averages-Colorado, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and Wyoming-but those can be
explained by small numbers of unusually high awards to exonerees
in states with few of them. Here again, the variation among states
is striking. The average annual award is lowest in Georgia, less than
$15,000 per year. Georgia also lacks a state compensation statute,
giving it the unhappy distinction of being one of the states in which
exonerees would least likely be compensated.
The average annual figure offers an important point of
comparison to state compensation statutes. Every statute which
imposes a cap or limit on annual or total recovery is set at a rate
substantially less than $305,000. Many hover around the $50,000
per year standard set by amendments to the federal compensation
statute.201 To the extent that $305,000 per year of wrongful
200 A number of Chicago-area wrongful convictions are attributed to three
officers (Jon Burge, Reynaldo Guevara, and Ronald Watts). Don Babwin, New
wrongful convictions could pressure Chicago’s finances, StarTribune (June 3,
2018, 11:40 AM), http://www.startribune.com/new-wrongful-convictionscould-pressure-chicago-s-finances/484420981/. Over a dozen Brooklyn
wrongful convictions are tied to Louis Scarcella. See Chelsia Rose Marcius
and James Fanell, Dirty Detective Louis Scarcella insists, “I’ve done nothing wrong,”
despite sending 13 wrongfully convicted people to jail, N.Y. Daily News (May 20,
2018), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/law-punish-detective-louisscarcella-dirty-tactics-article-1.4000501.
201 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2012) (statute also provides for $100,000 per year for
those sentenced to death); see also Mich. Comp Laws Ann. § 691.1755(2)
(a) (West 2019) ($50,000 per year of incarceration); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 4.100.060(5)(a) (West 2019) ($50,000 per year; $100,000 per year if
sentenced to death); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:4C-5 (West 2019) (two times prior
income or $50,000 per year, whichever is higher); Cal. Penal Code § 4904
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imprisonment has, over time and over hundreds of cases, become
a just or fair average compensatory metric, it is clear now, if it was
not before, that the $50,000 federal standard and any state standard
based on it are not only arbitrary but arbitrarily low.
This data may put lawyers representing clients in particular
states to a difficult choice. Take, for example, the relatively recent
Texas statute and more recent Connecticut amendments to its state
compensation statute. Both are substantially more generous than
the national average. Texas’ administrative claim process is also
relatively prompt. In both states, though, accepting state money
requires a waiver of one’s right to file a federal civil rights or state law
tort claim. For lawyers with clients in need of financial support and
with uncertain prospects of winning a civil rights claim, opting for
the relatively generous no-fault state statute is the conservative and
entirely defensible choice, even if it means foregoing a potentially
larger recovery (and attorney’s fees) from a civil rights case. That
certainly has been the choice for the substantial majority of Texas
exonerees, but the choice would be more difficult in states with less
generous and/or less efficient state compensation schemes.
In states without preclusion provisions, the calculus may be
different. The data suggests that attorneys should seriously consider
pursuing viable civil rights and torts suits after successfully resolving
state claims, even in states which require the repayment of state
money if civil compensation is later awarded. The average annual
recovery is likely to be higher than that in a capped state, but the
potential for achieving it must, of course, be weighed by considering
the strength of the case.
Finally, civil rights or torts recoveries were awarded to
exonerees whose number of years lost was 32.1% of the total time
lost by all exonerees in the database. [Columns P and Q]. Recall
that state statutory compensation programs compensated more
broadly-providing money to exonerees with just over 50% of the
total years lost in states with statutes.
(West 2019) ($140 per day of incarceration = $51,110 per year); Miss. Code
Ann. § 11-44-7 (West 2019) ($50,000 per year; $500,000 cap); N.C. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 148-84 (West 2019) ($50,000 per year; $750,000 cap); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 961.06 (West 2019) ($50,000 per year; $2 million overall cap).
Interestingly, Table 10 shows that the average annual recoveries in death and
non-death penalty cases are not significantly different and Table 11 shows that
the regression analysis shows no statistical association between the amount
and a death/non-death sentence.
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Looking at the second column of Table 7 gives a simple
snapshot regarding characteristics that appear to be associated with
the likelihood of prevailing in civil compensation claims. Those
who pled guilty, experienced a false confession, and were wrongly
convicted in part due to perjury or false allegations had a higher rate
of prevailing than those with the opposite characteristics.
Unsurprisingly, the percentage of prevailing claimants
who were wrongly convicted at least in part as a result of official
misconduct was higher than those without official misconduct in
their criminal cases. What is surprising, however, is that nearly
60% of civil compensation cases tagged by the Registry as those
not involving official misconduct nevertheless resulted in an award
for the plaintiff. Since the vast majority of those awards were the
result of a settlement rather than verdict and since, generally, civil
compensation cases require proof of official misconduct, the high
percentage is difficult to explain. It may suggest inaccuracy in the
Registry’s coding, differences between the Registry’s conception of
official misconduct and that required in these cases, or a desire by
some defense counsel to minimize litigation risks by settlement.
There was some greater likelihood of success of plaintiffs
who were earlier aided by innocence organizations and those
who were not. DNA exonerees had, as expected, a higher rate of
prevailing than non-DNA exonerees, but the difference was quite
small. The prevailing rates for African-Americans, whites, and
Hispanics were roughly the same. The likelihood of prevailing was
higher in the Northeast than in other parts of the county and, thus,
not surprisingly, the percentage of exonerees successfully filing for
civil compensation in blue states was significantly higher than in red
states.
The logistic regression analysis helps narrow the number of
characteristics associated with higher rates of prevailing by holding
all other variables constant. Table 9 displays the results:
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Table 9 (Logistic Regression Analyzing Receipt of Civil
Compensation)
95% Confidence
Interval

Characteristic

P Value

Odds Ratio

CIU

0.7043

0.854

0.379

1.926

GP

0.0125

2.135

1.177

3.87

IOA

0.0077

1.883

1.182

2.999

DP

0.3269

0.714

0.365

1.399

DNA Ex.

0.0002

3

1.691

5.325

FC

0.3842

1.269

0.742

2.173

MWID

0.3701

0.799

0.489

1.305

F/MF

0.9175

0.977

0.631

1.513

P/FA

0.2234

1.34

0.837

2.146

OM

0.005

1.81

1.196

2.74

Sexual Assault

0.7347

0.713

0.375

1.359

Drugs

0.8116

0.871

0.308

2.461

Child Sexual
Abuse

0.567

0.672

0.356

1.271

Robbery

0.6361

0.652

0.252

1.687

Other Crimes

0.7009

0.861

0.484

1.532

Asian

0.9479

1.986

0.205

3.767

Caucasian

0.9361

1.065

0.696

1.631

Hispanic

0.9318

0.847

0.473

1.514

Native
American

0.9713

>999.999

<0.001

>999.999

Other

0.9596

>999.999

<0.001

>999.999

Female

0.3223

0.71

0.361

1.399

Midwest

0.8299

1.389

0.844

2.285

Northeast

0.0001

2.64

1.425

4.889

West

0.0386

0.891

0.456

1.742

Blue State (2016)

0.0015

2.141

1.338

3.425

Years Lost

0.544

1.009

0.981

1.037

As has become familiar, the regression analysis shows that
receiving assistance from an innocence organization and having been
exonerated by DNA are positively associated with the likelihood of

Vol. 11, No. 2

Northeastern University Law Review

777

prevailing on civil compensation claims. The odds of receiving civil
compensation are three times greater for DNA exonerees than nonDNA exonerees. Interestingly, but difficult to explain, is that pleading
guilty to a crime one did not commit is positively associated with the
likelihood of prevailing on a civil compensation claim, as it was with
state statutory compensation claims.
When the Registry determines that official misconduct has
contributed to the wrongful conviction, the exoneree is more likely
to prevail than those whose cases did not involve official misconduct.
The odds of prevailing are 1.8 times greater for those victimized by
official misconduct than those not. Those wrongly convicted in the
Northeast are more likely to prevail than in the South. The odds of
prevailing on a civil compensation case are 2.1 times greater in a
blue state than in a red state.
Again, there was no statistical association between gender or
race and the likelihood of prevailing in civil compensation. Nor was
there an association between the crime for which the exoneree was
wrongly convicted or the years lost and the likelihood of prevailing
on a civil compensation claim.
3. Average Annual Civil Compensation
Finally, we tried to determine whether there was any
correlation between the characteristics we examined and the
amounts prevailing civil compensation plaintiffs received per year
of incarceration. One important caveat is in order. This recovery
metric-award divided by years lost-is the only practical and
objective measurement available for analysis. But, framing it in this
way implies that damages end on the day of release from incarceration.
In reality, many exonerees suffer from ongoing medical conditions
contracted in prison, continued psychological harm, reduced life
expectancy, and ongoing lost wages.202 Unless it is specifically set
forth in a court judgment, as it was Odom v. District of Columbia203 and
Tribble v. District of Columbia,204 it is impossible to determine whether
an award by verdict or settlement accounts for post-release harms.
202 David Cloud, On Life Support: Public Health in the Age of Mass Incarceration, Vera
Inst. Just. (Nov. 2014), https://www.vera.org/publications/on-life-supportpublic-health-in-the-age-of-mass-incarceration.
203 Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013 CA 3239, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2,
at *3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015).
204 Tribble v. District of Columbia, No. 2013 CA 3237, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4,
at *81 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016). These cases were discussed at length
in Gutman, supra note 11, at 376–79, 380–82.
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If they do, the metric we use here by necessity-average annual
amounts per year of incarceration-are effectively overstated.
First, we tried to determine whether there was a relationship
between years lost and average annual recoveries. In theory, exonerees
should receive the same average amount of civil compensation per
year of wrongful imprisonment regardless of the length of the term.
In practice, lawyers in these cases understand that the metric for
compensation depends on many other variables, such as the extent
and severity of the official misconduct, the exoneree’s life story, the
degree of harm experienced in prison and following release, lost wage
calculations and dozens of other factors. And, of course, settlements
reflect a compromise that accounts for ranges of predicted damages
and likelihoods of prevailing on many issues.
We found, as shown in Figure 6, somewhat surprisingly, that
the average annual award generally slopes downward over time.205 It
is uncertain how much to read into that other than it may conform to
an uncomfortable and often unstated intuition that those in prison
adapt to their lack of freedom, learn measures of self-protection and,
thus, experience less physical and psychological harm over time.

Figure 6 (Amount of Civil Award Per Year Lost by Group of
Year Lost (Two-Year Bands))

Second, we turned our attention to the average annual
205 There is one large exception in the 32–34 range involving a particularly large
recovery for a single individual.
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compensation awards obtained by exonerees with each of the
characteristics we studied. The objective was to determine whether
there was a correlation between particular characteristics and the
amount of recovery. Table 10 lists the average annual amounts
received in civil compensation litigation by prevailing plaintiffs by
characteristic.

Table 10 (Average Annual Amounts of Civil Compensation
by Characteristic)
Amount Total

Years Lost Total

Amount Per
Year

All Exonerees

$1,717,529,707

5612

$306,046

Females

$49,325,133

187.8

$262,647

Males

$1,668,204,574

5424.2

$307,549

Caucasians

$519,591,416

1616.3

$321,470

Blacks

$976,647,133

3397.5

$287,461

Hispanics

$215,361,264

544.9

$395,231

Other

$5,929,894

53.3

$163,873

CIU

$195,245,000

537

$363,585

No CIU

$1,522,284,707

5075

$299,958

GP

$218,995,460

651.8

$335,986

No GP

$1,498,534,248

4960.2

$302,112

IOA

$714,339,000

2119.3

$337,064

No IOA

$1,003,190,707

3492.7

$287,225

DNA Ex.

$686,194,113

1973.3

$347,739

No DNA Ex.

$1,031,335,594

3638.7

$283,435

DP

$178,244,083

519.9

$342,843

No DP

$1,539,285,624

5092.1

$302,289

FC

$486,765,083

1377

$353,497

No FC

$1,230,764,624

4235

$290,617

MWID

$508,637,173

1846

$275,535

No MWID

$1,208,892,535

3766

$321,002

F/MF

$461,627,045

1636.7

$282,047

No F/MF

$1,255,902,662

3975.3

$315,927

P/FA

$1,360,799,467

4114.6

$330,725
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Amount Total

Years Lost Total

Amount Per
Year

No P/FA

$356,730,241

1497.4

$238,233

OM

$1,251,265,923

4028.6

$310,596

No OM

$466,263,785

1583.4

$294,470

Murder

$1,309,410,126

3935.1

$332,751

Sexual Assault

$235,749,280

890.8

$264,649

Drugs

$2,842,501

28.2

$100,798

Child Sexual
Abuse

$72,121,000

392.6

$183,701

Robbery

$16,737,000

76.3

$219,358

Other Crimes

$80,669,800

289

$279,134

Midwest

$658,976,031

1737.8

$379,201

Northeast

$647,797,045

1962.1

$330,155

South

$218,971,265

1087

$201,446

West

$191,785,367

816

$235,031

Blue State
(2016)

$1,313,828,649

3770.6

$348,440

Red State
(2016)

$403,701,058

1832.3

$220,325

Table 10 reveals a number of interesting and sobering findings.
Especially noteworthy is the substantial variation of average annual
awards between men and women, particularly given the much longer
average lost years for men than women. Interestingly, the average
annual awards for whites were $34,000 more than for blacks, but
the average annual award for Hispanics was nearly $74,000 more
than for whites.
Although, in theory, the crime for which the exoneree was
wrongly convicted should have no bearing on the annual civil
compensation, the data shows that those convicted of murder
received the largest average annual awards-over three times those
convicted of drug offenses. Perhaps there is a gender aspect to this.
According to the Registry, the worst crime of wrongful conviction
was murder for 40% of men, but only for 29% of women. Sexual
assault was almost non-existent for women, while it was the worst
crime for 15% of men. Twenty-four percent of females were wrongly
convicted of drug crimes while only 10% of men were. Child sexual
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abuse was the worst crime for about 17% of women, but only 11%
of men.206
Those aided by a conviction integrity unit or an innocence
organization, and those exonerated by DNA or sentenced to death
received significantly more annually than those without those
characteristics. There were also significant variations geographically.
Average annual awards were highest in the Midwest and Northeast
and dramatically lower in the South and West. Thus, it is not
surprising that the average annual civil compensation award in blue
states was more than 50% higher than in red states.
Again, causation cannot be inferred from these simple
percentages. The data in Table 11 do not permit a conclusion, for
example, that women receive less per year than men because of their
gender. Other characteristics may explain that observation. Thus, we
ran a linear regression analysis which examined each characteristic
against its opposite or others in the same category (crime, region,
race), holding other characteristics fixed. The results are set forth in
Table 11.

Table 11 (Linear Model207 Result of Average Annual Amount
of Civil Compensation)208
Characteristic

Estimates

P Value

Conviction Integrity Unit

$23,7610

0.8021

Guilty Plea

-$25,356

0.7141

Innocence Organization Aid

$58,820

0.2823

Death Penalty

-$61,150

0.5029

DNA Exoneration

$110,797

0.0895

False Confession

$52,635

0.4006

Mistaken Witness Identification

-$44,212

0.4984

False/Misleading Forensics

-$73,152

0.2268

206 Nat’l Registry of Exonerations, supra note 57.
207 Here, we want to explain the relationship between the average annual amount
of civil compensation and all the characteristics. Because the response
variable-amount of compensation-is a continuous variable, we used a
linear model instead of logistic model.
208 Estimates of a linear regression model show the impact of the corresponding
characteristics on the response variable. More specifically, estimates represent
the difference in the predicted value of outcome (average annual amount
of civil compensation here) for each one unit change in the corresponding
characteristic while all other characteristics in the model remain constant.
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Characteristic

Estimates

P Value

Perjury/False Accusation

-$4,006

0.9527

Official Misconduct

$81,637

0.169

Sexual Assault

-$19,292

0.814

Drugs

-$387,865

0.0213

Child Sexual Abuse

-$187,477

0.0443

Robbery

-$179,398

0.2399

Other Crimes

-$186,713

0.0269

Asian

-$26,891

0.923

Caucasian

$302

0.9958

Hispanic

$182,327

0.017

Other

-$117,397

0.8074

Female

-$81,427

0.4567

Midwest

$172,451

0.0215

Northeast

$37,170

0.6668

West

-$3,644

0.9706

Blue State (2016)

$76,279

0.2356

Years Lost

-$14,226

<.0001

In Table 10, fairly wide differences in annual average civil
compensation awards are observed within the studied characteristics.
The final question addressed was whether the characteristic can
explain the difference-that, for example, the average annual
compensation award for blacks is lower than whites because of that
racial difference, or whether that difference is explained by other
characteristics.
As it turns out, relatively few variables we tracked are
statistically associated with average annual civil compensatory
outcomes. The wrongful conviction of drug, child sexual abuse
and “other” crimes is associated with substantially lower awards.
Interestingly, those wrongly convicted and prevailing in civil
compensation claims in the Midwest are associated with average
annual compensation awards of over $172,000 per year more than
those in the South, all other factors being fixed. For every year lost,
the annual award drops by over $14,000 per year. For reasons hard
to explain, Hispanics were associated with over $182,000 per year
more compensation compared to African-Americans.
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As interesting is the lack of correlation between all other
factors and civil compensatory outcome. There is no correlation
between being white or black and compensatory outcome. There is
no association between average awards and gender, conviction in
red or blue states, any of the tags, or any of the wrongful conviction
factors. The percentage differences we saw in Table 10 are simply
not explained by any particular characteristic we studied.
4. The Overall Landscape and Conclusions
In the end, we should view the compensatory landscape from
the perspective of those exonerees who attended the Innocence
Network conference. Their narratives often begin with the truism
that no amount of money can compensate them for their lost liberty
and profound suffering. Given that reality, there should be a route to
compensation guided by several principles, of which two are absent
from this analysis. First, compensation and non-compensatory
social services should be provided quickly after exoneration. Second,
the amount of compensation should be large enough to permit
the exoneree to be sufficiently compensated and to incentivize
improvements in policy and procedure to reduce the incidence
of future wrongful convictions without being so large as to deter
states and municipalities from cooperating in the effort to surface
wrongful convictions and from settling meritorious cases seeking
compensation.
The remaining principles have been a focus of our study.
There should be a breadth of coverage-a compensatory framework
that results in high rates of filing claims or suits and awarding
compensation while targeting those higher rates to exonerees with
the most time lost. Compensatory generosity and breadth of coverage
should not be widely variant among states; how an exoneree fares
in their quest for compensation should not depend on geographic
circumstance.
Spreadsheet 2 offers some insight into the full compensatory
picture, including breadth of coverage and inter-state variability.
Combining together state statutory claims and federal civil rights and
state tort lawsuits, 1,210 of 1,802 formerly incarcerated exonerees,
or 67% sought at least one remedy. [Columns S, T]. Column V shows
that 628, or 35%, obtained one form of relief or the other while 218
obtained both state and civil compensation [Column W]. Thus, 846
of 1,802 or 42.3% received some compensation. [Columns V, W,
X]. This covered just under 60% of the lost time, indicating, as we
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showed, higher rates of filing and prevailing by those with more
years lost. [Column Z]. Put differently, over 40% of the years lost to
exonerees in our database were uncompensated.
In September 2018, the Registry noted the passage of a tragic
benchmark. At that point, the years lost to both state and federal
exonerees crossed 20,000, the equivalent of the full lifetimes of 250
people. Our study concludes that those experiencing some 8,000
of those years of wrongful incarceration received no compensation
from the state or any governmental entity or actor. The study also
shows that these absences of compensation are not evenly spread
throughout the United States. The state of wrongful conviction is a
very important explanatory variable.
The percentages by state of 1) exonerees seeking
compensation, 2) exonerees receiving some form of compensation,
and 3) years lost for which some compensation was paid varies
widely.209 With respect to all exonerees in the database, both
incarcerated and not, out of states with more than four exonerees,
West Virginia, Ohio, and Mississippi had the highest percentages
of exonerees seeking compensation; New Mexico, Montana, and
Rhode Island were by far the lowest, with roughly a fifth of the filing
rates of the highest states. West Virginia, Nebraska, and Mississippi
had the highest percentages of claimants obtaining an award, but
Alaska, New Mexico, and South Carolina had none. The exonerees
in five states received compensation for over 80% of the years lost
in those states: Mississippi, Nebraska, Virginia, Massachusetts, and
Illinois. In contrast, twelve states with more than four exonerees
compensated less than 30% of the years lost.210
Weighting each of these three factors equally, we conclude
with a state-by-state grade sheet on breadth of coverage, counting
both state statutory and civil compensation, excluding the ten states
and territories with less than five exonerees.

209 In Spreadsheet 2, the percentages are shown in Columns T, X, and Z. The
discussion in the text that follows, however, reflects the percentages associated
with all 2,000 exonerees, rather than those incarcerated.
210 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, and Tennessee
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Chart 3 (Overall Breadth of Coverage)
Grade
A+
A
AB+
B
BC+
C
CD+
D
DF

State
Mississippi, West Virginia
Illinois, Nebraska
Massachusetts, Virginia, New York, Ohio, Louisiana,
Connecticut
North Carolina
Washington, Oklahoma, California, District of
Columbia
Utah, New Jersey
Minnesota, Michigan, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, Nevada,
Texas
Colorado, Wisconsin, Indiana, Kentucky, Puerto Rico
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Maryland, Florida, Georgia
Alabama, Montana
Arkansas, Oregon, Rhode Island, Alaska
Arizona, South Carolina
New Mexico

Mississippi is hardly the most generous state, but generosity
is not the only feature of a compensatory system that may define
its fairness. Breadth of coverage-the prospect of at least some
compensation encompassing as many years lost to wrongful
incarceration as is possible-serves as a competing measure of
fairness. If we adopt that perspective, we can answer the question
we started with: why it is that Mississippi is the best state in which
to be exonerated.
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